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Life's Golden Tree:
Empirical Scholarship and American Law
Carl E. Schneider*& Lee E. Teitelbaum*
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
Und griin des Lebens goldner Baum.
[Gray, dearfriend, is all theory,
And green life's golden tree.]

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
Faust

.Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor of Internal Medicine, University of
Michigan. I am grateful to the editors of the Utah Law Review for generously releasing this article
from obedience to the usual conventions, including the practices and citation rules of The Bluebook:
A Uniform System of Citation and those of the Utah Law Review. In turn, I cheerfully release the
editors from responsibility for any errors, confusions, and infelicities that may have ensued.
*Late Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law, University of Utah.
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A PREFATORY WORD FROM DEAN TEITELBAUM'S CO-AUTHOR
More years ago then I like now to remember I sat in this building and
listened to-yes, more than that, was dissected by-men all but one of
whom are now dead. What I gotfrom them was not alone the Rule in
Shelley's case .. .. I carriedaway the impress of a band of devoted
scholars; patient, considerate, courteous and kindly, whom nothing
could daunt and nothing could bribe. The memory of those men has
been with me ever since. Again and again they have helped me when
the labor seemed heavy, the task seemed trivial, and the confusion
seemed indecipherable.
Learned Hand
The Bill of Rights
Lee Teitelbaum and I drafted this article several years before his lamentable
death. We were both distracted by other projects and laid the piece aside. When
he died, I undertook to complete it to honor a man who as friend and colleague
brought more goodness to my life than I could ever have deserved.1
I have tried to let this article reflect the qualities that made Dean Teitelbaum
so distinguished in his calling. He was an irresistible teacher, an influential
scholar, a solicitous colleague, a superb dean. He succeeded in those things
because he turned all his intelligence and energy on them. More, he was attentive
to the human beings around him. Not just to his students, colleagues, and staff,
but to the people-the individual human beings-who lived under the law he
studied. Dean Teitelbaum wrote about theory, but he thought about people.
This article, then, is not just about using empirical research to improve legal
scholarship. It is about how we law professors lead our lives and do our work,
about the responsibilities we owe the society whose government we instruct. It
is, then, more a collegial colloquy than a law review "Article" in the dreadful
sense that term has acquired.
Dean Teitelbaum exemplified the traditions of learning in which he was
raised. He was a skilled lawyer, but he was more than a technician. He was a
liberally educated and broadly read gentleman to whom craft was a duty and
elegance a delight. I have here given myself a pleasure he too often denied
himself-allowing good taste to subdue foolish custom. For example. Legal
scholarship now drags behind it a Marley's chain of citation forms, participial
parentheticals, stylistic dogmas, abbreviation rules, signaling conventions, and
footnoting formulas.

'See Carl E. Schneider, A Tribute to Lee E. Teitelbaum, 90 Cornell L Rev 5 (2005).
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Again the spectre raised a cry, and shook its chain and wrung its
shadowy hands.
'You are fettered,' said Scrooge, trembling. 'Tell me why?'
'I wear the chain I forged in life,' replied the Ghost. 'I made it link
by link, and yard by yard; I girded it on of my own free will, and of my
own free will I wore it. Is its pattern strange to you?'
I have freed Dean Teitelbaum from the fetters of the Bluebook by replacing it
with the Chicago Manual of Legal Citation2 and from the usual strictures of the
law review regimen in order to present and preserve his voice and vision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Forthe rationalstudy of the law the black-letterman may be the man
of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statisticsand the
master of economics. It is revolting to have no better reasonfor a rule
of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry I
Oliver Wendell Holmes
The Path of the Law
A. THE PROBLEM OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Iflatter myself that I love a manly, moral, regulatedliberty as well as
any gentleman of that society.... But I cannotstandforwardand give
praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions, and
human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it stands stripped
of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical
abstraction.
Edmund Burke
Reflections on the Revolution in France
By the end of the last century, the lessons for legal scholarship of its
beginning had been confirmed but not learned. Those were the lessons of the
legal realists who summoned their colleagues to empirical research. Throughout
the century other voices reiterated the advice. When, sporadically, it was taken,
the results demonstrated its wisdom. But neither adjuration nor example has won
enough practicing converts. As this century opens, the legal academy still scants
2

This choice is wittily and crushingly explained in Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the
Bluebook, 53 U Chicago L Rev 1343 (1986).
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the empirical research so necessary to its work. But let us not be weary in well
doing: for in due season we shall reap, if we faint not. The cause is right, the
moment ripe.
We will not trek through the long argument for empirical scholarship in legal
studies. That has been done, 3 admirably and often, and the case's merits are now
plain and familiar. We cannot debate them because no one will mount a
systematic argument against them.4 Our problem, rather, is to persuade more
people to practice what many people preach.
Whatever the virtues of empirical research, a derisory fraction of us do it. As
Peter Shuck observes, "[E]mpirical research.., is a decidedly marginal activity
in the legal academy today. Quantitatively, at least, it comprises a trivial
5
proportion of the work that most law professors do." Richard McAdams and
Thomas Ulen concur: "Empirical methods are still rare in legal scholarship: very
few law professors buttress their arguments by appeal to tests of statistical
significance or even with descriptive statistics .... The systematic organization

of data and its presentation in revealing ways may be a routine part of many
6
scholarly disciplines, but it is not yet a routine part of legal argumentation."
Thus one study found that "a vast majority of those [law professors] surveyed
7
believed that there was a lack of empirical research in legal scholarship." Robert
Gordon's analysis of changes in legal research did not even find empirical
research prominent enough to be a category.8 Russell Korobkin
conducted an extensive search for articles relevant to the topic [of
empirical research on contract law] over the last fifteen years. Despite
3

"[C]alls for greater empiricism in legal scholarship are routine." Tom Ginsburg, Ways of

Criticizing Public Choice: The Uses of Empiricism and Theory in Legal Scholarship, 2002 U

Illinois4 L Rev 1139, 1164.
To incite an argument about empirical research, you don't advocate it; you say that law
professors bungle it. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U Chicago L Rev
1 (2002), and the indignant replies that ensue.
5

Peter Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J Legal

Education 323, 323 (1989). To like effect: "While Professor Schuck's earlier observation that the
two main forms of legal scholarship-theoretical and doctrinal-account for 'almost the entire
corpus of legal scholarship' remains largely accurate, it is especially accurate if one views legal
scholarship in its entirety." Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 Pepperdine L
Rev 807, 812 (1999). "[L]aw reviews contain a surfeit of doctrinal writing as well as high theory,
to the exclusion of scholarship that connects doctrine and theory with the way law actually
Paul Brest, Plus (a Change, 91 Michigan L Rev 1945, 1951 (1993).
operates."
6
Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction, Symposium: Empirical and
Methods in Law, 2002 U Illinois L Rev 791, 791.
Experimental
7
Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the
Academy and Profession, 30 Wake Forest L Rev 347, 362 (1995).
8
Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars,and the "Middle Ground,"91 Michigan L Rev 2075,

2099-2101 (1993).
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the fact that more than 500 law journals are published regularly in the
United States alone, and that contract law is a relatively rich area for
legal scholarship, I was able to identify fewer than thirty articles
relevant to this review, and many of these either only arguably meet the
definition of "empirical" or provide a tenuous link between the data
gathered and any contract doctrine. 9
Finally, in what follows we proffer example after example of ways empirical
legal scholarship is as wretchedly scanted as it is sorely needed.
Not only is empirical scholarship not done; it is disfavored. Lawyers and law
professors "are very apt to be scornful of the findings of social science. This is
an offshoot of a professional self-image of onmicompetence . . . . It is also a
reflection of the lawyer's wish to maintain a pattern of practice and teaching in
which he can play by ear." David Riesman wrote those words half a century ago,
but they remain too true.' Only a decade ago Robert Weisberg had to say that
"almost all criminal law scholars ignore [criminology's theories]
out of a
predisposed disdain for the intellectual power of sociology."" Similar sentiments
still echo in faculty lounges around the country.
"But shall we live in hope? All men, I hope, live so." Law professors today
do more empirical research than ever before. This is partly because there are
many more scholars under much more pressure to do much more scholarship. But
empirical scholarship has probably increased proportionately too. A hint of this
comes from a survey of scholarship which found two significant changes between
1960 and 1985, one of which was that "work that seeks to evaluate the
effectiveness of law increased."' 2 A later survey concluded that while doctrinal

9

EmpiricalScholarship in ContractLaw: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls, 2002 U Illinois L Rev

1033, 1035-1036.

' 0 David Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Trainingand Colleagueship, 9 Stanford

L Rev 643 (1957). Professor Riesman began his academic career as a law professor but abandoned
law teaching and became a celebrated sociologist at Harvard. See David Riesman, On Discovering
and Teaching Sociology: A Memoir, 14 American Rev of Sociology 1 (1988). More recently,
another social scientist/lawyer spoke of encountering among some (but not all) law professors "a
tenacious insistence that social scientific inquiry lacks any value for, or relevance to, serious legal
scholarship." Shari Seidman Diamond, EmpiricalMarine Life in Legal Waters: Clams, Dolphins,

andPlankton, 2002 U Illinois L Rev 803, 803. For them, 1n]o empirical study or set of studies can
ever be good enough to persuade. It is either hopelessly flawed, or simply irrelevant." Ibid at 812.
" 'Robert Weisberg, CriminalLaw, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63

Colorado L Rev 521, 527 (1992).

12Michael J. Saks et al, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice,
and Legal
Scholarship?:A Systematic ComparisonofLaw ReviewArticles One GenerationApart, 30 Suffolk

U L Rev 353, 371 (1996).
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work still dominates legal scholarship, empirical work "recently and dramatically
has expanded in law reviews, at conferences, and among leading law faculties. 3
One cause and consequence of this welcome trend is the rise of two
influential movements. The Law and Society movement's very raison d'etre is
to promote the study of law's functioning as a social institution and its effects on
social behavior. It has brought some social scientists into law and some lawyers
to the social sciences. The Law and Economics movement has also been
beneficial, since while it promulgates theories that sometimes seem to make
empirical inquiry superfluous, it also provides testable hypotheses and has
"stimulated some imaginative empirical investigation."' 4 Indeed, the adamant
simplicity of the economist's model has provoked skeptics to create whole new
subfields, like behavioral economics.
And still on the brighter side: American law professors embrace empirical
research much more warmly than their counterparts abroad, particularly those in
civil-law systems. As Graham Hughes observes, "part of the grand success
achieved by American law schools and legal scholarship has been to marshal and
deploy the many disciplines and techniques they need to execute their many
missions."'" This, and the greater tendency of the common-law tradition to see
law as "a set of procedures for continually adapting some broad principles to
novel circumstances" rather than "a final codification of legal rules,' 6 as driven
by experience more than logic, have helped make American law professors
international leaders in empirical legal scholarship.
So what is our plan? We briefly review the reasons empirical scholarship is
crucial to the intelligent and productive study of law. We then search for the
arguments contra. Since those arguments live in the hearts and not the writings
of law professors, we draw on years of discussions with colleagues. Having
winkled out the arguments against empirical scholarship, we dispute and, we
13Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law

Schools, Vanderbilt Law & Economics Research Paper No. 05-20 2 (2005). Even a decade ago,
Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 Michigan L Rev 2075, 2085

(1993), could argue that "[s]everal fields of law, which until recently scholars rarely studied in
social context, have begun to develop rich empirical literatures," including topics in labor law,
administrative law, bankruptcy law, employment discrimination, and criminal law. But Professor
Gordon is no more content than we: "[I]f I had the power.., to redirect legal scholarship, I would
use it to try to promote more empirical work, institutional description, and law-in-action studies.
Sometimes I think I would happily trade a whole year's worth of the doctrinal output turned out
regularly by smart law review editors and law teachers for a single solid piece describing how some
court, agency, enforcement process, or legal transaction actually works." Ibid at 2087. Amen.

14Peter Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J Legal

Education 323, 328 (1989).
15Graham Hughes, The GreatAmericanLegal ScholarshipBazaar,33 J Legal Education 424,

425 (1983).
16James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How CertainSchemes to Improve the Human Condition

Have Failed 357 (Yale U Press, 1998).
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believe, refute them. No small part of the resistance to empirical scholarship
seems to be the feeling that it cannot describe the world well enough to be useful
in legal scholarship. True, empirical research reveals the world through a glass,
darkly. But without empirical research, the lawmaker and the scholar know
fearfully little, and much of that is wrong. Sociologically, law professors inhabit
a ludicrously unrepresentative sliver of American society. Psychologically, an
impressive literature establishes that we all systematically misperceive the life we
lead and the worlds we inhabit. So when law professors prefer their own
perceptions to systematic study, they cannot trust what they see.
As we said a moment ago, the argument in principle for empirical research
is little controverted, but the research itself is little done. We hope, fondly and
perhaps fatuously, to inspire more research not by admonition, but by examples.
We proffer two kinds of examples. First, we detail the ways one field-family
law-suffers from the absence of empirical research and would profit from its
abundance. Second, we detail the ways the law has repeatedly and wretchedly
failed to achieve its purposes, a failure whose causes lie partly in the lack of
empirical research and a failure which can only be discovered and repaired
through that research.
B. THE VARIETIES OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
There are and can be only two ways of inquiry into and discovery of
truth. The one flies from the senses and particularsto axioms of the
most general kind, and from these principles and their [supposed]
immutable truth, proceeds to judgement and to the discovery of
intermediate axioms. And this is the method that is now in use. The
other calls forth axioms from the senses andparticularsby a gradual
and continuousascent, to arrive at the most generalaxioms last of all.
This latter is the true but untried way.
Francis Bacon
Novum Organum
Three ideal types of legal research can usefully be distinguished. First,
doctrinal research. This is the study and development of legal doctrines by the
beloved traditional methods of case and statutory analysis. At its heart is the
effort to construct rational and coherent legal rules. It is a crucial and estimable
enterprise. It is the enterprise for which law professors are specially trained and
at which lawyers are uniquely skilled. It demands ample experience, fine acuity,
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and rare judgment.17 It is a task to which even the most empirical of law
professors can return with the confident anticipation of craft pleasure.
Theory is the second kind of legal scholarship. By theory we mean "no more
than systematic explanation at some level of abstraction of how law acts or of
why it should act in a particular way. Free-speech theory, for example, in some
of its forms explains how free speech promotes wiser government and why free
speech is morally and socially desirable apart from that consequence."' 8
Theoretical work too is demanding. It is necessary to a systematic understanding
of the way legal institutions work and of the principles that should animate the
law. It is not the presence of theory we deplore; it is the absence of empirical
research. It is theory that drives out fact.
The third category of legal research is, of course, empirical. Many of our
colleagues understand the term to denote only elaborate and abstruse quantitative
research. For us, "empirical" describes any attempt to gather information in some
disciplined way about how the world actually works. In other words, we treat as
empirical research any attempt to acquire data about social behavior the law seeks
to regulate, the way legal institutions behave, and the effect of law on social
behavior. The social sciences have many methods of acquiring that knowledge.
Survey research is one, but so are participant observation and ethnological
investigation. These methods range broadly in their rigor and rewards. But all of
them can fall within our definition of "empirical."
To illustrate by example: Marsha Garrison's examination of court records
to determine how judges actually allocate spousal wealth on divorce is empirical.
Stewart Macaulay' s interviews with businessmen about their contractual relations
are empirical. Sarat and Felstiner's observation of divorce lawyers and their
clients is empirical. Carol Weisbrod's reading of historical documents concerning
the contractual relations between nineteenth-century communes and their
members is empirical. Tom Tyler's survey of how various populations feel about
obeying the law is empirical. Richard Uviller's sojourn with the New York City
police is empirical. In the house of empiricism there are many mansions.
We want to inspire the empirical research that provides a basis for proposing
laws wisely and evaluating them intelligently. However, we also value a
scholarship that falls between our stools. Sometimes empirical research relevant
to law has already been conducted by academics from elsewhere in the university.
Because it is done by the adepts of other disciplines, is reported in the journals
of other specialties, and is readily comprehensible only to other adepts, law
professors often overlook it. Regrettably. There should be an honorable place

17Carl

E. Schneider, Teaching Lawyers: American Practiceand JapanesePossibilities,42

Law Quadrangle Notes 72 (Summer 2002).

E. Schneider, Definition, Generalization,and Theory in American Family Law, 18 J
L Reform 1039, 1041 (1985).
18Carl
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in our discipline for analyses of the empirical research other disciplines have
done. The reviews by Phoebe Ellsworth and Robert Levy 9 and by David
Chambers" of the psychological literature on how custody arrangements affect
children exemplify this worthy enterprise.
II. WHY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH?
Each prudent, small step, based on prior experience, yields new and
not completely predictable effects that become the point of departure
for the next step. Virtually any complex task involving many variables
whose values and interactionscannot be accuratelyforecast belongs
to this genre ....Where the interactions involve not just the material
environmentbut socialinteractionas well-buildingandpeopling new
villages or cities, organizing a revolutionary seizure of power, or
collectivizing agriculture-the mind boggles at the multitude of
interactionsand uncertainties....
James C. Scott
Seeing Like a State
A. THE EMBARRASSINGLY SIMPLE CASE
One must know concrete instancesfirst;for,as ProfessorAgassiz used
to say, one can see no fartherinto a generalizationthan just so far as
one's previous acquaintancewith particularsenables one to take it in.
William James
The Varieties of Religious Experience
The case for empirical research is embarrassingly simple: "If laws are
intended to produce certain results, questions about whether they do produce the
expected results, whether they produce otherresults, and whether the identifiable
results are as consistent with the reason for law as one might have anticipated, are
all important to examine."2 The less you know about the world, the harder it is
to write good rules to govern it (however easy ignorance makes it to write bad
19Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Robert J. Levy, LegislativeReform of Child Custody Adjudication:
An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in FormulatingLegal Policies, 4 Law & Society Rev 167
(1969).20
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the SubstantiveRules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
Michigan
L Rev 477 (1984).
2
'Lee E. Teitelbaum, An Overview of Law and Social Research, 35 J Legal Education 465,
466 (1985).
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ones). More precisely, to legislate well, you need to understand the social
situation you want to regulate, how the legal institutions you deploy will behave,
and how people and institutions will respond to that behavior. To evaluate your
rule, you need to know how it is applied and what effects its application has had.
In a complex society, none of this can be ascertained without empirical research.
When we say this to some of our colleagues, they rush to insist that
knowledge of the world is insufficient. You must decide what you want to
accomplish; you need principles to guide your choices. No doubt. Empirical
knowledge is a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. But principles too are only
a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. Principles cannot tell you where you are,
how to get where you want to go, or whether you have arrived. "It is no doubt
true that you cannot get from is to ought. But you ought to know what is is before
you say what ought ought to be."22
In short, we do not suppose that all research must be empirical. Courts reach
decisions by analyzing doctrines, and law professors should help them do so.
Some of that analysis relies more on logic than experience, for legal doctrines
should be internally consistent and fit intelligibly with their neighbors. But
doctrines serve social ends, and they must negotiate the world in which they
operate.
Put it another way. Every doctrine, every theory, rests on assumptions about
the behavior of the regulators and the regulated. For this reason, most debates
about legal doctrine reflect disagreements about fact whose resolution shapes the
normative issues involved. For example, at the heart of the Miranda controversy
are questions about how often it frees the guilty and cripples the police. If rarely,
the issue hardly merits the vehemence it provokes. If often, more empirical
questions arise: Does Mirandain fact lead police to treat suspects appropriately?
Can we find better ways of supervising the police?
Empirical questions pervade even doctrines that seem most instinct with
principle and that are most persistently discussed at Everests of abstraction. Judge
Posner, for example, thinks "the greatest need of constitutional adjudicators ...
is
the need for empirical knowledge ... ."" Unanswered questions proliferate:
Above all what are the actual and likely effect of particular decisions
and doctrines? Did Brown v. BoardofEducationimprove the education
of blacks? Did Roe v. Wade retard abortion law reform at the state
level? What effect have the apportionment cases had on public
policy?... Some of these questions might actually be answerable, and

22

Carl E. Schneider, The PracticeofAutonomy: Patients,Doctors,andMedicalDecisions xv

(Oxford
U Press, 1998).
23

Richard A. Posner, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 73 NYU L Rev 1, 3 (1998).
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the answers would alter constitutional practice more than theorizing has
done or can do.2 4
Our quarrel, then, is not with scholarship that develops and refines theory
(or doctrine, of course). We want to emphasize this point. Some theory develops
the tools for the normative evaluation of the ends and means of law. This has
always been necessary legal scholarship and always will be. Other theory seeks
to make systematic our understanding of how human beings, social institutions,
and legal agencies behave. When that work succeeds, it guides law-makers in
writing regulations and scholars in advising law-makers.
Nevertheless. A primary development in recent scholarship has been the
elevation of theoretical work to a new dignity. In one study, "[w]hile only about
fifteen percent of the 1960 articles were viewed as theoretical pieces, more than
forty percent of the 1985 articles were seen as theoretical."2 5 The change is not
just quantitative. Theory has gained prestige; doctrine has lost it. These changes
concern us, for several reasons.
First, we need empirical research more than theory. Theories abound, from
the concretely doctrinal to the abstractly philosophical. The best contribution law
professors can make to most theories is to test them empirically. Thus are theories
refined and made workable.26
Second, we often hear that theory is "prior" to empirics, that we cannot
begin empirical work until we formulate a theory that tells us what to ask. This
may well be backwards, as Sherlock Holmes himself taught: "It is a capital
mistake to theorize before one has data." Good theory about social behavior and
about legal institutions seems at least as likely to grow out of a well-informed
sense of the world (just as Max Weber' s theories emerged from his extensive and
intensive engagement in empirical research). This is not surprising. As one
investigates the world, theoretical ideas are generated through the attempt to
explain one's discoveries. Empirical work produces surprises which must be
explained. Even when empirical work is inspired by a theory, its most interesting
results are often unrelated to it. Robert Ellickson's study of Shasta County, for
instance, moved from its origins in the Coase Theorem to a richly fruitful study
24

Ibid at 11-12.

25

Michael J. Saks et al, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice,and Legal
Scholarship?:A Systematic Comparisonof Law Review Articles One GenerationApart,30 Suffolk

U L Rev
353, 370 (1996).
26
For example: "The evidence shows that the criticism that public choice lacked empirical
support was partly correct, and that the negative implications drawn from public choice theory have
not been supported by empirical testing. Rather than abandon the theory, scholars refined their
propositions to reflect experimental results and have more explanatory power." Tom Ginsburg,
Ways of CriticizingPublic Choice: The Uses ofEmpiricismand Theory in Legal Scholarship,2002

U Illinois L Rev 1139, 1140.
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of how informal norms organize social life and shoulder aside legal institutions
and ideas.27
Third, really good theory is really hard to do. It requires a level of learning
few people can boast and an aptitude for abstract thought that is rare. And in
some areas (constitutional law comes to mind), theorists compete with the best
thinking of two millennia. Frankly, most of us will not significantly contribute to
most theory. On the other hand, many of us can contribute intelligent and useful
empirical work that improves theory and doctrine alike.
Fourth, today no one thinks something can be good in theory but bad in
practice.2 8 But far too much theory is absorbed in the former to the exclusion of
the latter. Academics across the ideological spectrum have bemoaned this.
Professor Schuck: "The kind of theory deployed in legal scholarship . . . frequently ignores the positive, behavioral side of the relevant
disciplines, such as economics, political science, and sociology. Sometimes the
theory is drawn from other academic fields that do not seem to take facts very
seriously."29 Professor Gordon "mention[s] some types of theory that one can find
in today's law reviews that strike me as, if not always useless, not very useful."
(His list is long.) In short, we object not to theory, but to fact-averse theory. Don
Herzog is right-"theory had better not be what you get when you leave out the
facts."3
A last point. Our colleagues sometimes concede the value of empirical work
but deny that law professors should do it. Why not leave empirical research to
social scientists who are trained to do it? The short answer is the rule of
necessity-social scientists will never do enough of the kinds of research lawmakers and their advisors need. Students of sociology, psychology, anthropology,
economics, medicine, and many other fields all contribute empirical research
which is crucial to legal scholarship. The more they can be induced to do, the
better. The more they will collaborate with law professors on empirical projects,
the better.

27

Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard U Press,
1991). On the relationship between theory and empirical research in law, see Bridget M. Hutter &
Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Law's Relationship with Social Science: The Interdependence of Theory,
EmpiricalWork, and Social Relevance in Socio-Legal Studies, in Keith Hawkins, ed, The Human
Face of
Law: Essays in Honour of Donald Harris 37 (Clarendon Press, 1997).
28
Immanuel Kant, On the Old Saw: That Might be Right in Theory, But It Won't Work in
Practice, in Steven M. Cahn, ed, Classics of Modern Political Theory: Machiavelli to Mill 557
(Oxford
29 U Press, 1996).
Peter Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J Legal
Education 323, 328 (1989).
301 Hear a Rhapsody: A Reading of The Republic of Choice, 17 Law & Social Inquiry 147,
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But social scientists' research is usually driven by the theoretical concerns
and traditional topics of their disciplines, not what lawmakers need to know.3
Lawyers care about some questions-like how legal institutions operate-that are
not solidly within the purview of other disciplines. Legal academics, because of
their legal training, can perceive and grasp some critical things about legal
institutions better than lay scholars. Finally, lawyers may feel free-almost
obliged-to integrate the empirical and the normative in a way many social
scientists will not but somebody must.
B. THE LAW-MAKER'S VIEW
[T]he proper organizationof a society and the conduct of its affairs
were based upon abstractprinciples .... They were to be discovered
in natureby human reason, by a technique of inquiry availablealike to
all men and requiring no extraordinaryintelligence in its use.
Michael Oakeshott
Rationalism in Politics
Empirical research would be unnecessary if lawmakers knew all the relevant
facts about regulatory issues. Of course they do not. The happy conceit of classic
common-law theory was that judicial error is self-correcting. That theory
supposed that the stream of cases would reveal misunderstandings of fact and
miscalculations about rules. This was always dubious, and today the common-law
supposition is so outlandish that it is virtually forgotten.
Cases can force micro-doses of reality on courts, but micro-doses are not
enough. Even the micro-doses are processed in ways that distort their reality. For
example, Judge Posner testifies: "Judges can rarely resist analogies, a form of
'evidence' (if it can be called that) that is generated by ingenuity rather than by
knowledge. Analogies are typically... inexact and often.., misleading."3 Or
as Bacon put it, "The human understanding on account of its own nature readily
supposes a greater order and uniformity in things than it finds.... [I]t devises
parallels and correspondences and relations which are not there."33
Law-making institutions usually have some capacity to discover some facts,
and sometimes they even use that capacity. Trial courts can gather some sorts of
data. But however good they may be with what Horowitz calls "historical facts"
31

Put differently: "[A] legal scholar with an interest in a behavioral science is torn between
development of the implications of the behavioral theory and mastery of the particular legal
subject." George L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as
University,
33 J Legal Education 437, 437-38 (1983).
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Richard A. Posner, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 73 NYU L Rev 1, 15 (1998).
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Francis Bacon, Novum Organum 56 (Open Court, 1994).
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("the events that have transpired between the parties to a lawsuit"), they are bad
at "social facts" ("the recurrent patterns of behavior on which policy must be
based").34 Limited though trial courts are, appellate courts are worse. And the
higher the court, the worse it becomes. A homely illustration: When Professor
Schneider clerked, he wrote memoranda on two thousand cert petitions and kept
up on fifty argued cases. When he drafted opinions, he had ten days from start to
finish. Therefore, even if social facts were available-and they rarely were-he
had little time to study them, and his Justice had less.
Administrative agencies have experts on staff, may commission studies, and
must solicit comments on proposed rules. But even this apparatus cannot supply
the research agencies need. For example, administrative agencies must calculate
the economic impact of significant regulations. However, agencies apparently
fare badly at collecting and analyzing the information they need for calculating
that impact, as any student of HIPAA confidentiality rules will believe.3"
Legislatures rarely undertake systematic research; rather, they assemble the
research of others. Legislators have staffs and legislative committees have staffs,
and sometimes they hold lengthy hearings and amass stacks and stacks of data.
Even then, however, the data are often swamped by competing kinds of evidence
and argument. Consider David Hyman's dismaying description of how Congress
passed a "drive-through delivery" law.36 Such laws, which discourage managed
care organizations from sending mothers home from the hospital soon after
delivering a child, were adopted by state legislatures "with breathtaking speed."
In Congress, "Senators from across the political spectrum condemned drivethrough deliveries as 'unconscionable' (Senators DeWine and Helms), 'scary'
(Senator Biden), and 'simply unacceptable' (Senator Snowe)." What was the
evidence for these confident and harsh assertions?
"The case against drive-through deliveries was built with anecdotal reports
of infants who died following rapid postpartum discharges." The anecdotes were
confirmed by Senators' "personal experiences, including discussions with their
daughters and daughters-in-law." This evidence was so inflammatory that
"[e]mpirical studies casting light on the issue were ignored." Who needs studies
when the facts are obvious?

34Donald L. Horowitz, The CourtsandSocial Policy45 (Brookings, 1977) (footnote omitted).

On why courts gather and use social facts badly, see Carl E. Schneider, Making Biomedical Policy
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Individual Senators argued that it was "common sense" for an
insurance policy to include the mandated coverage (Senator Bradley)
because physicians could not detect certain common medical problems
within the first twenty-four hours of birth (Senators Bradley, MoseleyBraun, Kennedy, Snowe, Bryan, and Feinstein), and, therefore, there
were "clear health problem[s] with women who are discharged too
early" (Senator Bradley).
This "common sense" was convincing because it jibed with other self-evident
assumptions: "The Congressional Record is replete with condemnation of
insurance companies' greed and MCOs' willingness to place the lives of women
and infants at risk."
In fact, the anecdotes were misleading and the common sense wrong. "The
empirical scholarship on the appropriate postpartum length of stay does not
support the conventional wisdom that there are significant perils associated with
early discharge." More specifically,
no study has demonstrated any statistically significant increase in infant
or maternal mortality after a rapid postpartum discharge. One recent
study of neonatal mortality demonstrated that of the infants who died
in the neonatal period, 90% "were symptomatic in the first 8 hours of
life, 93% in the first 12 hours, and 99% by 18 hours of life."
Furthermore, "to prevent one incremental readmission (which will last on average
2.5 days), we would have to provide extended postpartum hospitalization for at
least 232 well newborns, and perhaps as many as 866." This is not only
expensive, it is risky, since hospitals are dangerous places (one reason for the
movement to shorten hospital stays). And there are better ways to deliver good
postpartum care than hospital confinement.
In sum, Congress's decision to allocate social resources (between $.9 and
$1.8 billion annually) to prolonged postpartum hospital stays primarily rested on
anecdotes, many of them peddled by medical groups with an economic interest
in the legislation. The anecdotes were trumpeted by the always credulous press.
They were confirmed by the personal experience and common sense of the
American Congress. The systematic evidence carefully developed over many
years was obliterated by dubious stories and false assumptions.
So law-makers can be led to empirical research, but they cannot be made to
use it. Empirical data compete with less reliable but more alluring evidence. It
does not follow, however, that empirical research does not matter. Bryant Garth
hopes that empirical research "can help civilize debates by providing a certain
common ground, or at least a common language." He concedes that the way "the
evidence is used is not always a pretty sight, but the cumulative effect of battles
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fought in terms of evidence is to make the evidence gain importance." One reason
is that "legitimate argument today ...requires that 'data' be examined," so that
"one way to gain an advantage in an argument is to produce data ....And when
one side produces data, the other side needs data as well." Law-makers "must
37
take into account or distinguish credible and legitimate evidence." This is not
everything, but it is something.
This process can build a groundwork of conceded data. Professor Garth
gives an example: "[N]o one after the RAND report can say with any credibility
that case management today is radically changing litigation for better or worse;
nor that litigants are particularly upset about any recent changes in judicial
behavior; nor that ADR is detested by litigants or lawyers; nor that ADR as
"38
practiced dramatically saves litigant time and money.
C. THE SCHOLAR'S VIEW
God forbid I should insinuate anything derogatory to that profession
which is another priesthood, administrating the rights of sacred
justice.... [T]hey are good and useful in the composition; they must
be mischievous if they preponderate so as virtually to become the
whole.... [W]hen men are too much confined to professional and
faculty habits and, as it were, inveterate in the recurrentemployment
of that narrow circle, they are rather disabled than qualified for
whatever depends on the knowledge of mankind, on experience in
mixed affairs, on a comprehensive, connected view of the various,
complicated, external and internalinterests which go to the formation
of that multifarious thing called a state.
Edmund Burke
in France
Revolution
the
on
Reflections
1. Reasons for Resistance
People hunger and thirst after theories to such a degree that whatever
puts their own wishes into a compact and intelligibleform will obtain
from them a degree of allegiancewhich may be called either touching
or terrible.
James Fitzjames Stephen
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity
37
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If law-makers do not have, cannot get, and will not use information adequate
to their needs, it falls to scholars to supply it. Law professors make their
contribution by providing information, proposals, and theories to law-makers.
The information must to be sound and systematic, and proposals and theories not
based on such information will be untrustworthy.
In our experience, some law professors acknowledge that policy built on
poor evidence is like a house built upon the sand but still doubt that empirical
research is worth doing. They do not justify this view systematically, but their
implicit thinking appears to endorse what Professor Schneider calls "hyperrationalism." Hyper-rationalism is
"the substitution of reason for information and analysis. It has two
components: first, the belief that reason can reliably be used to infer
facts where evidence is unavailable or incomplete, and second, the
practice of interpreting facts through a [narrow] set of artificial analytic
categories." Hyper-rationalism, in other words, tempts us to believe we
can understand how people think and act merely by reasoning and
without investigating.39
Hyper-rationalism is a dominant tradition in the legal academy, though it is
more honored in the breach than the observance. Even after the legal
realists-when it was acknowledged that "one had to know something about
society to be able to understand law, criticize it, and improve it"-hyperrationalism could persist because the "something"
was what any intelligent person with a good general education and
some common sense knew; or could pick up from the legal texts
themselves (viewed as windows on social custom); or, failing these
sources of insight, would acquire naturally in a few years of practicing
law: a set of basic ethical and political values, some knowledge of
institutions, some acquaintance with the working of the economy.4 °
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Carl E. Schneider, The PracticeofAutonomy: Patients,Doctors,and Medical Decisionsxv
(Oxford U Press, 1998) (quoting Carl E. Schneider, Lawyers and Children: Wisdom and Legitimacy
in Family Policy, 84 Michigan L Rev 919, 932 (1986)). Another description of the phenomenon:
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criminal law scholarship does the same." Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the
Small 40World of Legal Scholars, 63 Colorado L Rev 521, 529 (1992).
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For hyper-rationalists, then, empirical research is not undesirable, just
unnecessary. They know enough to analyze doctrine and develop theory. Why
consult social science if it largely reports the obvious?
Michael Saks devilishly answers this question.41 He lists a handful of
uncontroversial propositions. Like this: "If children are raised to have positive
attitudes toward individual freedom, they are more likely as adults to tolerate the
exercise of rights by fellow citizens...." Then he cites research undercutting the
uncontroversial propositions, research that itself seems pretty obvious. Like this:
"Children, like adults, endorse freedom as an abstract principle but do not carry
that endorsement through to concrete situations." Saks' lesson? "[T]here are no
'obvious' findings. Most outcomes are plausible."
Law and life abound in the peculiar and the unpredictable. Who would have
thought, for example, that people who had just tested positive for HIV experience
no "significant increase in levels of distress"? 2 That even smokers greatly overestimate the risks of smoking and that young people over-estimate them even
more than adults?43 That 20% of the population would rather have two weeks of
vacation when others have only one than four weeks of vacation when others
have eight?" The unpredictability of human behavior is a basic fact of lawmaking that is crucial and crucially under-appreciated, if it is noticed at all.
Hyper-rationalists reject empirical research because it only proves the
obvious. Others of our colleagues reject it (implicitly if not always explicitly)
because it cannot prove anything. They point triumphantly to the conflicting
results research often yields, to poorly executed empirical research, and to the
methodological perplexities of even excellent empiricism.45 They lavish their
hypertrophied critical skills on identifying the weakness of any study. Propose an
empirical project to a law professor and be barraged with reasons the project must
fail. Propose the project to a sociologist and receive imaginative suggestions for
making the project work. How much has changed from the time decades ago
when David Riesman-the distinguished sociologist and erstwhile law
professor-discovered that when he described his social-psychological studies
of freedom of speech and libel in England and America, his "law professor
41
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friends, most of them concerned with large questions of public law, thought all
this was interesting but could not respond to it in a collegial way; but [Paul]
Lazarsfeld, Harold Lasswell, Robert and Helen Lynd, Erich Fromm, and Marie
46
Jahoda did respond to this work...,,
So what of the "reliability" criticism of empirical research? First, it is
overstated. Careful and thorough research often establishes propositions with as
much certainty as is vouchsafed in human affairs. (Recall, for example, Professor
47
Garth's description of the effect of the RAND study of civil litigation.)
Or consider one aspect of the "reliability" criticism-the claim that
empirical research is unreliable because researchers must be parti pris. The
concern is legitimate, especially when "advocacy" competes with "scholarship"
as the law professor's vocation. A pre-eminent family law empiricist writes that
lack of confidence in the unbiased nature of the principal investigators
involved in the smaller scale studies presents grave difficulties.
Since . . . panel study projects are so large and time consuming.., many influential studies come from those with personal stakes
in the outcome. In fact most of the research on same-sex relationships,
for example, comes from people who are in same-sex relationships.
Some of the work on the effects of no-fault divorce came from
proponents of the movement or those who took advantage of the new
laws themselves, and much of the smaller scale research on the effects
of third party day care or the effect of father custody seems to be of the
same ilk.48
Nevertheless, empiricists can reach conclusions that confound their
preferences. Professor Chambers did not want to find that jail worked.49 Michael
Wald was a principal proponent of leaving abused children in their homes but
found little consolation in his research.5" Robert Mnookin's study of child
custody clouded his predictions about negotiating in the shadow of the law.5"
46
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And there remains the standard answer to the reliability criticism - Al Smith's
answer to criticism of democracy: the only cure for it is more of it. In this way,
52
social science is like science-research must stand the test of replication.
The mystery about the reliability criticism is that it has no alternative to
empirical research that is not plainly and grossly inferior. As Dean Teitelbaum
wrote,
Whether such research is done or not, legal scholars of every
persuasion will continue to make assertions about the world, about the
place of law within it, and about the beliefs and conduct of legal
agencies or of the entire legal culture. These statements are uttered
they reflect no methodology which would remind
confidently because
53
us of their limits.
2. The View from the Tower
The special information that lawyers derivefrom their studies ensures
them a separaterank in society, and they constitute a sortof privileged
body in the scale of intellect. This notion of their superiority
perpetually recurs to them in the practice of their profession: they are
the masters of a science which is necessary, but which is not very
generally known; they serve as arbitersbetween the citizens; and the
habit of directing to their purpose the blind passions of parties in
litigation inspiresthem with a certaincontemptfor thejudgment of the
multitude.
Alexis de Tocqueville
Democracy in America
When scholars lack the research they need for making policy, they are
thrown back on their own scanty resources, forced to draw conclusions about the
world from their observations of it. How reliable are those observations? We
answer from two perspectives-the sociological and the psychological.
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.a. The Sociological Perspective

Of the power of favor or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil
sense, I have found no trace, not even the faintest ....But every day
there is borne in on me a new conviction of the inescapable relation
between the truth without us and the truth within. The spiritof the age,
as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the group
in which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or
fellowship have given us a place.
Benjamin N. Cardozo
The Nature of the JudicialProcess
When law professors look out on the world, they see little, and that
unrepresentative. Law professors, especially the elite law professors who publish
disproportionately and enjoy disproportionate influence, generally come from and
inhabit an atypical iota of society quite isolated from their countrymen. They
nestle in the cocoon of university campuses, and in a prosperous pocket of those
campuses. They attended elite law schools, clerked for elite judges, took elite law
jobs, receive elite salaries, and flock with other elites. Not only is theirs the world
of elites, their professional experience outside the academy is today small. Elite
law professors have often clerked for a judge or two and worked a few years in
a large law firm, but the "young teacher is usually not deeply informed about
specific aspects of the legislative or regulatory process."54 And as law schools reorient themselves from the profession to the academy, it becomes ever harder for
young teachers to broaden their professional experience.
Law professors not only occupy a small and odd niche; the culture of that
niche is astonishingly uniform. Even demographically. Professor Schneider
recently examined the website biographies of colleagues who joined his school's
faculty in the last couple of decades. Half of those with a law degree received it
from Yale, one third from Harvard, three from Columbia, one from Virginia, and
one from Yeshiva. (The last of these also had a Harvard Ph.D.) Roughly half are
Jewish; apparently one is Catholic; few are religious. They seem largely to come
from the class of which they are now members-the professional upper-middle
class. The faculty boasts a wonderful range of interdisciplinary expertise, but
otherwise it is hard to imagine a more homogeneous group in such a
heterogeneous society.
Similar in situation, elite law professors are similar in thought. The range of
political views among them is so straitened that the greater part of American
54
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political opinion is virtually excluded (and little welcome). On many social
issues, opinion is so standard that law professors repeatedly assume strangers
55
agree with them, even though their views are markedly unrepresentative.
No one in a large and complex society can understand much of it from
personal observation. But most law professors see so particularly tiny a tidbit of
the world that they can have little sense of how most of it works. Worse, little in
their lives makes it likely that professors will recognize their ignorance. Not
having seen the rest of the world, they assume it resembles their own. Only
empirical research can correct that error.
b. The Psychological Perspective
The human understanding, once it has adopted opinions, either
because they were already accepted and believed, or because it likes
them, draws everything else to support and agree with them. And
though it may meet a greaternumber and weight of contraryinstances,
it will, with greatand harmfulprejudice,ignore or condemn or exclude
them by introducing some distinction, in order that the authority of
those earlierassumptionsmay remain intact and unharmed.
Francis Bacon
Novum Organum
Suppose away the sociological problem and another remains. Human
psychology distorts what human beings see. "The human adult . . .makes
egregious judgments and ill-considered decisions, harming himself and others
through the misapplication of informal, but usually helpful strategies and through

55
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Similarly, I know few of my colleagues to be
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" Law and
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the inability or unwillingness to apply more formal inferential principles., 56 That
is, people rely on "'knowledge structures' which allow the individual to define
and interpret the data of physical and social life and 'judgmental heuristics'
which reduce complex inferential tasks to simplejudgmental operations. '57 These
knowledge structures and heuristics work handily when they work routinely. But
they betray us when we forsake the familiar. Francis Bacon saw this keenly:
The human understanding is most moved by things that strike and enter
the mind together and suddenly, and so fill and inflate the imagination;
and it then imagines and supposes, without knowing how, that
everything else behaves in the same way as those few things with
which it has become engaged. The understanding is slow and awkward
at ranging over the whole field of remote and heterogeneous instances,
by which axioms are tested as if in the fire, unless it is constrained to
such action by strict rules and a powerful authority.5 8
Today, the ways human minds warp what they perceive have been
catalogued at disheartening length. For instance:
Characterization of samples is distorted by the differential
"availability" in experience and memory of various events.
Characterization of the population is compromised by ignorance of
statistical considerations, chiefly those of sample size and sample bias.
Covariation assessment is overly influenced by prior theories of
expected covariation and is insufficiently influenced by actual data
configurations. Causal analysis suffers from a similar overutilization of
prior theories and from overreliance on the sheer conspicuousness of
potential causal candidates. People have little knowledge of the
regression considerations underlying prediction tasks and substitute
simple similarity or representativeness judgments. Finally, people have
little appreciation of strategies for disconfirmation of theories and often
persist in adhering to a theory when the number of exceptions to the
theory exceeds the number of confirmations.59
An example or two may help the reader digest that wholesome but unappetizing
quotation. Many distortions in thinking lead people to mis-estimate how common
56
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events are. For instance, the "availability heuristic" induces us to over-estimate
the frequency of vivid things. So people wrongly suppose flying is more
dangerous than driving (per mile traveled) because airplane accidents make a
strong and lasting impression.
Another example. People see patterns whether they are there or not, and
having seen patterns, cling to them despite tsunamis of evidence. "The lay
scientist seems to search only until a plausible antecedent is discovered that can
be linked to the outcome through some theory in the repertoire. Given the
richness of diversity of that repertoire, such a search generally will be concluded
quickly and easily.6 ° So coaches, sportscasters, and fans unite in believing in the
hot hand in basketball, even though statistical analysis proves it illusory.6 '
We have dipped our oar into the ocean of evidence about the ways and
reasons people misunderstand the world. Their misunderstanding is compounded
because few people know how gruesomely normal it is to reason badly. On the
contrary: "Philosophers have long noted that people are often much too confident
of their 'knowledge' and the accuracy of theirjudgments. Empirical research has
provided evidence of this overconfidence and of the alarming extent to which
confidence may often be completely unrelated to accuracy... "62 Often wrong
but never in doubt describes most of us most of the time. Oblivious to our
ignorance, we cannot ameliorate it. And do education and intelligence make
academics different? "Ninety-four percent of college professors believe they are
more productive than their average colleague."63
In short, the problem is not just that law-makers and scholars need empirical
information they do not have. It is also that without reliable information, lawmakers and scholars-like the rest of us-speculate in miserably unreliable ways,
do not realize that they are doing so, and are perversely confident in error.
Unaided by empirical research, law-makers and scholars are notjust ill-informed;
they are wrong.
We have now stated the core of the case for empirical research. The case
was always strong. It grows daily stronger. There are no good arguments against
it. Yet empirical scholarship remains too little done. We think that most of our
colleagues acknowledge our points but have not recognized their power. To lend
verisimilitude an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative, we now offer two
60
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kinds of examples-first, examples of how empirical research can enrich a field;
second, examples of how the absence of empirical research can impoverish one.
III. OPPORTUNITIES
If I were asked to condense the reasons behind these failures into a
single sentence, I would say that the progenitors of such plans
regardedthemselves asfar smarterandfarseeingthan they really were
and, at the same time, regardedtheir subjects as far more stupid and
incompetent than they really were.
James C. Scott
Seeing Like a State
To show how convincing the case for empirical research is, to show how
empirical issues pervade a single area of law, to show how empirical research can
transform a field, we turn to family law. There is hardly an aspect of the field
whose intelligent treatment does not depend on empirical research, empirical
research which has not been supplied. In recent years, family law has changed
crucially, yet those changes rest on fragile empirical foundations. And this
despite a history of family law reforms that have monotonously failed to reach,
and may even have detracted from, their goals.
A. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FAMILY
Tho' marriage makes man and wife one flesh, it leaves 'em still two
fools.
William Congreve
The Double Dealer
Who, since Jonathan Swift, depreciates the welfare of the young? Who is not
a congregant in the religion of "the family"? Democrats and Republicans,
feminists and patriarchalists (if any such there be), unite in that one true faith. But
become programmatic, and the faith splinters into sects. What is a family; what
should it be? Orthodoxy answers: A man and a woman marry and (probably) have
children. Behold, a family. Law-makers often take the standard case as the only
case, descriptively and normatively. Departures seem uncommon descriptively
and therefore deviant normatively. This raises many questions. Most basically,
is the standard case as general as we presume? The answer to this question is
found in the work of demographers and sociologists.
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The standard family arises from marriage. In 1995, more than three-fourths
of white (and Asian) families were headed by married couples. But "standard" is
not "universal." Substantially fewer Hispanic households (68%), and less than
half of African-American households (46%), were headed by married couples.
Female-headed households made up 57% of all African-American households
and 34% of all Hispanic households. Moreover, families based on a married
couple are becoming fewer. Among whites, the proportion declined from 73% in
1970 to 63% in 1994. The more precipitous declines among Hispanics and
African-Americans were from 72% to 58% and from 64% to 43% respectively.
In short, the assumption that families are constituted by married couples is only
somewhat and variously true and less true than before.
In the standard family, children live with both parents. Indeed, in 1970 only
12% of all families with children were headed by a single parent. In 1994,
however, more than one-quarter of American children (28%) lived in singleparent households, almost always (86%) with their mothers.' Sixty-eight percent
of American children live with two parents, but only about 51% live with both
biological parents. The "standard" arrangement for children accounted for barely
more than half of all such arrangements in 1991.65
These data-which are reasonably well known to family-law
specialists-suggest any number of topics for study. Why the diminution in the
standard case? Demographic data point to some reasons. For example, fewer
people marry. The percentage of married adults in the population was 72% in
1970; it was less than 61% in 1996. Never-married Hispanics increased from 19%
to 30%, never-married African-Americans from 21% to almost 40%. People also
marry later. The median age of women's first marriage was 20.6 years in 1970
and 24.8 years in 1995. The median age for men increased from 22.5 years to
27.1 years.
A declining cultural commitment to marriage as the sole occasion for
intimacy is part of the story, but it itself opens up researchable questions. Some
of them can be identified apriori,like the hypothesis that that weakening reflects
a commitment to an ideology of individualism at the expense of institutional or
even small group concerns. Other hypotheses, however, call for empirical inquiry.
Is the increase in age at first marriage based on a diminished importance of
marriage as an avenue for intimacy and, if so, why do so many people who begin
by cohabiting ultimately wed? Does age at marriage reflect not ideology but
employment opportunities that delay marriage for women, as for men?

64Arlene F. Saluter & Terry A. Lugaila, MaritalStatus and Living Arrangements: March,

1996 (Current
Population Reports P20-496).
65

Arlene F. Saluter, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March, 1994 (Current

Population Reports P20-484).
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A decline in marriage rates and a rise in marriage ages need not imply an
explosion in nonmarital births. Nonetheless, nonmarital births have soared,
especially among young and African-American mothers. Between 1960 and 1989,
the number of births to unmarried girls under nineteen went from 87,000 to
337,000-almost quadrupled.6 6 It's remarkable: In 1960, about 15% of all births
to teenagers were out of wedlock. In 1989, two-thirds (67%) of all teenage
mothers were unmarried.67 In short, unmarried childbearing became the typical
case for teenage parents during the 1980s.
All these questions go directly to some of the most basic issues in family
law. And without well-founded evidence about those questions, family law must
rest on unsound foundations. But such evidence remains elusive.
B. THE EXPERIMENT IN DIVORCE REFORM
Now divorce implies a weakening of matrimonialregulation.Where it
exists, and especially where law and custom permit its excessive
practice, marriageis nothing but a weakened simulacrum of itself; it
is an inferiorform of marriage.It cannot produce its useful effects to
the same degree. Its restraintupon desire is weakened; since it is more
easily disturbed and superceded, it controlspassion less and passion
tends to rebel. It consents less readily to its assigned limit.
Emile Durkheim
Suicide
The Triumph of No-Fault Divorce. The shift away from the two-spouse
family is associated with the transformation of American divorce. Until midcentury, the connection between family stability and social welfare seemed
obvious and seemed to require restricting the grounds for divorce. No longer. All
states now allow some kind of no-fault divorce. 68 Typically, one spouse need only
assert that the marital relationship is irretrievably ended.69
The divorce revolution is a natural experiment in domestic relations, an
experiment done not in a laboratory with carefully developed and sharply focused
hypotheses, but a diverse series of experiments affecting millions of people over
several decades. The experiment rested on a series of premises. Underlying them
66Bureau of the Census, US Dept of Commerce, The Diverse Living Arrangements of
Children:
Summer, 1991 (Current Population Reports P70-38) (1994).
67

Mark F. Testa, Introduction, in Margaret K. Rosenheim & Mark F. Testa, eds, Early

Parenthoodand Coming ofAge in the 1990s (Rutgers U Press, 1992).

681985 Survey of American Family Law, 11 Family L Rep 3015 (1985).
69
E.g., Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, sec 305(b); Desrochers v. Desrochers, 347 A2d

150 (NH 1975); McCoy v. McCoy, 225 SE2d 682 (GA 1976).
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was, as Professor Schneider has argued, a shift in public discourse-one that deemphasized moral discourse in favor of instrumental claims, especially the
psychological goal of individual satisfaction.7" Divorce, it was said, liberated
spouses from dead marriages. From a family therapeutic point of view, divorce
was not "no fault" but "equal fault." Law and therapy both preached that divorce
reform promised enhanced happiness for the whole family.7 ' Against the earlier
belief that divorce traumatizes children, reformers claimed that divorce spared
children the trauma of parental conflict.72 "Creative divorce" might even make
children more sensitive and tolerant.73
What of this experiment that touches so many lives? Some effects are direct
and obvious. Changes in divorce policy and practice are associated with a
heightened divorce rate-which now approaches 50% for those who married in
the 1970s-with the resulting substitution (at least pro tem) of two families
headed by a single person for one "standard" family.
The questions go well beyond demographic effects. Changing divorce
changed marriage. These developments have helped bring us to ALl proposals
that yearn for the death of marriage as we know it. 74 These developments are not
due to no fault-divorce alone. They explain why people can divorce, but not why
nearly half those who marry do so. Perhaps, as reformers assumed, the divorce
rate merely reflects a long-standing level of failed marriages that, earlier, caused
sustained marital unhappiness. Perhaps no-fault divorce only supplied an honest
basis for recognizing dissolutions once possible only on perjurious grounds.7 5 Or
perhaps divorce reform itself contributed to marital breakdown by elevating
marital satisfaction over marital constancy. Perhaps the frequency of divorce
encouraged people to think marriage a poor place for intimacy. All these are
plausible suggestions with clashing implications for public policy. None has a
sound basis beyond speculation.
Relatedly, is the experience of divorce transmitted from generation to
generation? Reasoning without data, one could presume: (1) that the children of
70

Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformationof American Family Law, 83

Michigan
L Rev 1803 (1985).
7

'Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture 53-65 (Alfred Knopf, 1997).
For example, Susan Gettleman & Janet Markovitz, The Courage to Divorce 86-87 (Simon
& Schuster,
1974), think divorce "can liberate children."
73
Mal Krantzler, Creative Divorce:A New Opportunityfor Growth 211 (Lippincott, 1974).
74
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, ed, Reconceiving the Family: Critical Reflections on the
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American
Law Institute'sPrinciplesof the Law ofFamily Dissolution(Cambridge U Press, 2006).
75

Lawyers' and judges' dissatisfaction with manufactured adultery had much to do with New
York's divorce reform in 1966. See Hubert J. O'Gorman, Lawyers andMatrimonialCases 42 (Free
Press, 1963), for characterizations of prior divorce law. Herbert Jacob, A Silent Revolution: Routine
Policy Making and the Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States (U Chicago Press,
1988), is a historical analysis of divorce reform. Carl E. Schneider, LegislaturesandLegalChange:
The Reform of Divorce Law, 86 Michigan L Rev 421 (1988), analyzes that analysis.
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divorce would especially appreciate the reasons to stay married; (2) that such
children would find divorce unremarkable and acceptable; or (3) that divorce
causes psychological or economic sequelae for children that make their marriages
frail. Yet the association between parental divorce and divorce by their children
has only begun to be analyzed. There is some evidence of an intergenerational
effect, especially when wives or both spouses are the children of divorce.7 6 But
far too little is known to assess these key sequelae of the divorce revolution.
Little as we know about how modifying marriage affects divorce, we know
less about what promotes marriage. Little research has been done, and what has
been done-as is true of much research in family law-relies on small samples
of convenient subjects.7 7
A related question: Has divorce reform delivered its promised benefits? Are
unhappy spouses entering happier relationships, or simply other dismal ones? Are
husbands and wives affected equally? Wives are likelier to seek divorce than
husbands.78 Are husbands less willing to divorce and therefore less likely to be
made happy by divorce? Do the deleterious effects of divorce on wives,
especially long-married women who did not accumulate substantial wealth, point
in the other direction?79
Enthusiasts for creative divorce thought divorce protected children from
their parents' destructive conflicts. Perhaps. However, those enthusiasts also
wanted parents to collaborate after the divorce. So what is the best way to protect
children of fighting parents? Has any reduction in conflict been offset by other
consequences of divorce? Recent research suggests that children of divorce are
badly distressed initially and suffer some long term problems, including
difficulties with school and with adult relationships.8" Other research finds
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Paul R. Amato, Explaining the IntergenerationalTransmission of Divorce, 58 J Marriage
& Family 628 (1996); L.L. Bumpass et al, The Impact of Family Background and Early Marital
Factors
on MaritalDisruption, 12 J Family Issues 22 (1991).
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For example, one of the few studies of marital success is Judith S. Wallerstein, The Good
Marriage: How and Why Love Lasts (Houghton Mifflin, 1995), a qualitative study based on
interviews
of fifty couples.
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As of 1990, wives filed for six of ten divorces. Paula Mergenhagen DeWitt, Breaking Up
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To Do, American Demographics, October 1992, at 53.
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Divorce dramatically affects household income; the median income of married couples is
more than double that of households headed by women and more than triple that of households
headed by single mothers with children. Marsha Garrison, The Economic ConsequencesofDivorce,
32 Family & Conciliation Courts Rev 10, 18 (1994). Substantial property for distribution is
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greater evidence of long-term adaptation and great variability in responses.
Most of the research suffers from small and sometimes dubious samples. In short,
about the psychological effects of divorce on children, as about so much else, we
know little but legislate freely.
And money. What are the economic consequences of divorce? We think we
know some things: that families have paltry resources after divorce and that
mothers are worse off than fathers. But what are the long-term effects for
children? We do not know, even though the law of child-support has recently
been an active subject for reform.
There is, ultimately, much to understand about the divorce revolution which
cannot be supplied by reasoning without data. The need is, if anything, enhanced
by a nascent counter-revolution which includes proposals for covenant
marriage,8 2 for restricting divorce, and for letting judges consider a divorce's
effect on children in deciding whether to grant matrimonial relief.83 The counterrevolution raises as many unanswered questions as the movement to which it
responds. Should we anticipate another natural experiment? Will we do the
research to prepare for and evaluate it?
The Revolution in Spousal Support. The divorce revolution's emphasis on
individual satisfaction and its withdrawal from moral discourse have combined
with other policies to influence not only the grounds but the concomitants of
divorce. Until several decades ago, a married woman had fairly clear expectations
about a divorce. If she had been married for some time, if she had committed no
marital wrong, and if her husband could afford it, she was entitled to enough
alimony to live at the marriage's level.84 She was also entitled to enough child
support to keep her minor children at that level.
No longer. Divorce is now a liberation. And if a liberation, should not the
spouses' personal and economic links be severed? The erosion of fault grounds,
coupled with the impetus for gender equity, further implied that the parties should
be equal and independent after divorce and that the divorce should substantially
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E. Mavis Hetherington et al, Marital Transitions: A Child's Perspective, 44 American
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burden neither spouse.85 These changes had theoretical and practical implications
for economic orders at divorce. Alimony as a life-long "pension" for the wronged
spouse affronted the modem antipathy to fault and the goal of terminating the
relationship. And the movement of women into the workforce suggested that
divorcees could, and should, support themselves. So spousal support became an
evil to be ordered only if the wife could not support herself decently. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which is law in some states and policy in
others, permits maintenance only if the divorced spouse cannot support herself
through "appropriate" employment or is the custodian of a young child.8 6 Several
states explicitly limit the duration of alimony. 87 And some commentators want
alimony only to compensate for the residual loss of earning capacity arising from
economically rational spousal decisions, and not for other choices, like culturally
valued but economically irrational choices (including house-keeping but not child
care).8 8 The UMDA, and most states, also extend the de-emphasis of fault for
marital dissolution to alimony, making nonfinancial misconduct irrelevant to
financial awards.89
In the law of marital property, similar reasoning has led to attempts to
distribute wealth on divorce with an eye to avoiding maintenance. Drawing on a
social re-evaluation of women's domestic work, legislatures and courts attribute
assets acquired during marriage to the labor of both spouses, labor which is, in
some views, presumptively of equal value. In short, "equitable distribution" of
property supplants alimony. Many empirical assumptions and questions arise
from this experiment in redefining the finances of divorce. The experiment relies
on accumulated wealth to give both spouses an initial financial foundation, but
do families have such resources? If not-and they often don't-is the hostility to
alimony imprudent and unfair?
Some of the antipathy to permanent alimony assumes women now can
command salaries comparable to men' s,9° although the contrary is also asserted.9
It is widely assumed that women whose children are in school can and should
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This and the following paragraph draw on Leslie J. Harris, Lee E. Teitelbaum, & Carol A.
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support themselves, preferably by working full-time. With this go less-often
articulated assumptions. One is that the absence of alimony moves women into
the paid economy. Perhaps.93 But is their employment commensurate
economically and socially with their marital standard of living? If not, how do
such diminutions affect spouses and children? More generally, confining alimony
to rare and exigent cases may discourage wives from committing themselves to
their household and their children and encourage devotion to work and career.
Rightly, perhaps. 94 But can alimony laws affect behavior in matters so instinct
with cultural values? If so, what other consequences does the new regime have?
Would children be affected? Would both parents be deterred from pursuing their
careers? What would that do to the family's income and thus to opportunities for
family members (including children)?
When parents will not or can not assume responsibility for child care, it must
be purchased from others, donated by a relative, or foregone. Readiness to accept
these alternatives presumably reflects a belief that direct parental care for
children is relatively unimportant, even if generally desirable. This assumption
requires examination, examination that distinguishes direct child care, relative
care, and latchkey arrangements.9 5
The Revolution in Custodial Principles. The "best interest of the child"
remains the lodestar for custody decisions. To apply this truly vague standard
consistently and efficiently, courts have created second-level rules. Pre-eminent
among them has been the maternal preference, especially for children of "tender
years." It embodied an assumption that mothers would, ceteris paribus, take
better care of their children than would fathers. That assumption was sometimes
expressed in "essentialist" terms.9 6 But recently, the maternal preference has been
assailed on all sides. For some feminists, it reflects traditional roles and
compromises women's capacity to work full time. For some men, it overlooks
fathers' increased readiness to be engaged parents. From both perspectives, and

92
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less ideologically too, one appealing solution was the "primary caretaker"
preference. 97 It preserves traditional assumptions that continuity in care is
desirable and that experienced parents are better parents. But what new
consequences does it have? If, as is usual, the primary caretaker is the mother
who, under current alimony rules, is expected to work, she will have custody even
where the father has remarried and his wife would care for his child at home.
Does this matter?
And does it matter that the primary-caretaker preference assumes that one
parent will have custody? That assumption was challenged by a sudden and
dramatic movement that shared roots and momentum with the no-fault revolution.
Its proponents said that shared legal responsibility keeps both parents involved
with their children.98 Joint legal custody (which authorizes both parents to
participate in important decisions) became common, and joint physical custody
became less uncommon.9 9 Quite soon, enthusiasm for joint-custody subsided in
some states, but the actual effects of custody arrangements remains little
understood.' 0 Is it dangerous to divide the child's loyalties? Better to divide
children's loyalties than let them lose touch with a parent? Neither supposition
is silly, neither compelling. It would be nice to know.
And what is the reality of "joint custody"? Do legislative and judicial
preferences for joint custody affect judicial decisions? How does joint custody
work in real life? Do fathers with joint legal custody actually maintain closer
contact with their children and pay child support more faithfully than fathers
without it? How often does the parent without physical custody actually
participate in decisions? How often do joint custodians disagree about decisions,
and what happens when they do? Arejoint decisions better decisions? How stable
and happy are joint physical custody arrangements? How does changing houses
periodically affect a child's happiness, peer relationships, school work, and
prospects?
Other custody standards have recently changed. Many courts once
considered non-marital sexual relationships strong evidence of unfitness,
especially when the non-marital partner lived in the children's home,' and
placement with a parent of atypical sexual inclinations was disfavored. Current
attitudes are more mixed, and many courts treat heterosexual and homosexual
97

E.g., Burchard v. Garay, 724 P2d 486 (CA 1986); Garska v. McCoy, 278 SE2d 357 (WV

1981).
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conduct alike in denying custody only where the child is evidently harmed." 2
Similarly, the principle of psychological parenthood has eased recognition of
custody and visitation claims of people besides natural parents-stepparents,
same-sex partners,10 3 and especially grandparents. These last had no common-law
right to visitation over the parent's objection, but every state now permits
grandparents to petition for visitation in some circumstances.
The custodial revolution nearly matches the divorce revolution in its sweep,
and it raises nearly as many empirical questions. Since the child's best interests
remain the touchstone, insight into those interests remains crucial. But our
information is partial and problematic. So is our information about the secondlevel rules. Is it pernicious to offer the law's coercive authority to meddling
grandparents and in-laws? Do the rule of gender neutrality in custody awards and
the primary-caretaker presumption cancel each other out, as some research seems
to suggest?' More generally, are the assumptions undergirding changes in
custodial principles well founded? Do current standards effectively guide courts,
lawyers, and parents? Is the child's well-being truly unaffected if the former
primary caretaker must work after divorce, as a strong version of that
presumption supposes? 5 Are financial resources irrelevant to the choice of
custodian? We know so little that our answers to these empirical questions can
only be guesses. A poor basis, alas, for law that affects so many so much.
C. MORE
To try to regulate the internalaffairs of a family, the relationsof love
orfriendship, or many other things of the same sort, by law or by the
coercion of public opinion, is like trying to pull an eyelash out of a
man's eye with a pairof tongs. They may put out the eye, but they will
never get hold of the eyelash.
James Fitzjames Stephen
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity

02
1 Tucker v.

Tucker, 910 P2d 1209 (UT 1996); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P2d 660 (NM App 1992).
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"' This is one way to understand Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert H. Mnookin, Dividing the
Child: Social and Legal Dilemmas of Custody (Harvard U Press, 1992). Maccoby & Mnookin are
surprised by the conflict they find between a strong legal preference for gender neutrality and the
dominance of maternal custody. One way to explain this, however, is by the primary-caretaker
preference, which ordinarily means mothers win. Lee E. Teitelbaum, Divorce, Custody, Gender,and
of Law: On Dividing the Child, 92 Michigan L Rev 1808, 1832-38 (1994).
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We have only begun to catalog the empirical questions that must be
answered before wise family law can be written. We could go on. Take the fabled
movement from status to contract. There has been much writing about marital and
quasi-marital contracts, °6 but little research. What expectations do cohabitants
have, when do those expectations begin to look contractual, what terms do
contracts contain, what were people's relationships when they contracted, and
what happens when cohabitants part? Are contracts formal or informal, explicit
or implicit? How often are suits on such contracts brought? How are they
decided?
And spousal contracts? Academics dream of a world in which contracts
structure marriages. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act allows "[p]arties to
a premarital agreement ... [to] contract with respect to . . . any ... matter,
including their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy
or a statute imposing a criminal penalty."'' 0 7 Yet how do people choose to enter
into marital contracts, how do they negotiate them, what do the contracts say,
how well do spouses understand them, how do they work, how are they enforced,
and do spouses like them? We know not.
Contract law has also entered the realm of reproduction; surrogate-mother
contracts are Exhibit 1. Critics believe they too often cause agonizing disputes.
Do they? These contracts are several decades old, but this and other basic
questions are rarely studied.
We know dreadfully little about how family law institutions behave. The
interaction between divorce lawyers and their clients is little understood, despite
several studies that dramatize the value of such research. 0 8 What about the
lawyers who handle family law problems? Are they specialists? What do they do
well? Badly? What do they charge? How do they treat each other? Local
psychologists? Family court judges? How competent are they? These are
questions of the first importance, but apparently not of enough importance to
have generated a full-fledged literature.
What of judges who hear family law cases? And the other actors in the
family law story? Robert Levy has impressively shown how influential-and
perverse-a role social welfare agencies can play in custody disputes."' That
study cries out for replication. It is now common to appoint guardians ad litem
in custody disputes. That practice has been prolixlyjustified in abstract principle.
But of its consequences we know only one thing with confidence-it adds to the
06
1 For an

example, see Carl E. Schneider & Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law:
Principles,
Process,and Perspectives343-396 (West, 1996).
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'°SE.g., Kenneth Kressel, The Processof Divorce:How Professionalsand
CouplesNegotiate
Settlements (Basic Books, 1985); Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and
Their Clients:Power andMeaning in the Legal Process(Oxford U Press, 1995).
109Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigation in Divorce Cases, 4 ABF Research J 713
(1985).
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expense of the proceedings. Does it improve, or even affect, decisions? Who is
appointed? Competent but busy lawyers? Incompetent but idle hacks? What do
guardians do? Do they present arguments no one else would have presented?
How-if at all-do they affect the parties' relations? How much influence do
they have over the parties? Over judges? The questions are endless, crucial, and
answerable. But unasked.
In sum, every comer of family law is drenched with empirical questions on
whose answers good policy depends. Those questions are massively ignored.
When, rarely, they have been carefully addressed, the usefulness of the inquiry
110
has been resoundingly demonstrated. Yet partly because empirical research has
been scanted, family law reforms have almost routinely disappointed the hopes
so confidently expressed for them. It may be true that "[t]he jurisprudence of
'l
family law is increasingly influenced by social science research."' But Margaret
Brinig can still write that "[m]ost family law reform ... has been singularly
uninformed by empirical studies ... "112 And "[s]ince marriage and divorce
reform in various guises is before virtually every state legislature, important
Americans, will be made based on
decisions that will affect many, if not 'most
13
evidence."'
outdated (at best) statistical
Professor Brinig provides a troubling example of such a decision. A study
by Sherman seemed to show
that the mandatory arrest of domestic abusers resulted in a lower rate
of recidivism than did more traditional approaches to domestic abuse
complaints made to law enforcement officers. Based on Sherman's
"°Family law provides our illustrations, but even casual research uncovers field after field
where quite basic facts are undetermined. Examples? (1) "[W]e have no idea how much, if at all,
criminal justice administration affects the crime problem." Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law,
Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 Colorado L Rev 521, 524-25 (1992). (2)
"[Tihe scholarship produced by the plea bargaining debate has generally tracked the intellectual
agenda of the doctrinal debates, largely indifferent to empirical research and the administrative
culture of prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges that may well be the major determinants of
guilty plea rates." Ibid at 531. (3) "[W]e have relatively little reliable data over time on the civil
justice system on such matters as the costs of civil justice, alternative dispute resolution, or even
relative increases or decreases in particular kinds of cases in the state and federal courts." Bryant
G. Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical
Research, 49 Alabama L Rev 103,116 (1997). (4) "[O]ur society has been unable to produce
research that is even minimally adequate to answer our most basic questions about the behavior of
the civil justice system." Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behaviorof the
Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U Pennsylvania L Rev 1147, 1288 (1992).
trend is evidenced in court decisions, interdisciplinary conferences, multidisciplinary
,""This
professional organizations, and in major law reform projects .... Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F.
Kelly, SocialScience Knowledge in Family Law Cases:JudicialGate-Keeping in the Daubert Era,
L Rev 1, 3 (2004).
59 U Miami
2
11 Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U Illinois L Rev 1083, 1084.
3
1 Ibid at 1091.
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study, the single most frequent reform these days is mandatory arrest.
[But when the study was replicated,] ...the results were quite different
and in some cases completely opposite ....The follow-up studies have

been largely ignored, apparently, by state legislatures working on
domestic violence laws.114
That problem was caused partly by reliance on out-of-date but ideologically
appealing research. In a series of devastating articles, Marsha Garrison has shown
how the virtual absence of empirical research has promoted the adoption and
failure of several consequential family law reforms. For example, recent years
have seen unusual agreement about improving child support law by writing
guidelines. Yet "[w]hile Congress adopted the numerical guidelines requirement
with the aim of significantly increasing award levels and decreasing award
variability, available evidence suggests that these goals have not been met.
Awards calculated under existing guidelines do not appear to differ dramatically
'
from those produced under earlier discretionary standards."115
Similarly, few issues in family law have been more discussed than the
division of marital wealth, and in few areas has there been as much change. To
what end?
California replaced its equitable property distribution regime with a
rule requiring equal division of marital property on the assumption that
equitable distribution typically produced relatively equal awards for
husband and wife. The change was expected to curb case variation
without altering overall outcomes. But researchers later determined that
wives had typically received more than half of the marital property
under the old law, and they also discovered that deferred distribution
of the marital home in cases involving minor children declined
16
dramatically under the new one.'
Few areas of law affect human beings as often, as directly, as momentously
as family law. Few areas have been so much debated and reformed. Debate and
reform have been animated by deep and angry convictions about how people
114lbid at 1095-96.
115Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community?: An Evaluation of Two Models
of Parental

Obligation,
86 California L Rev 41, 44 (1998).
116

Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption
of the ALI
PrinciplesImprove Current Outcomes?, 8 Duke J Gender L & Policy 119, 122 (2001). Similarly:
Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases?:An EmpiricalAnalysis ofDiscretionary
Decision Making, 74 North Carolina L Rev 401 (1996); Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone
Awry: The Impactof New York's EquitableDistributionLaw Upon Divorce Outcomes, 57 Brooklyn

L Rev 621 (1991).
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should treat each other and the law should treat people. But family law has been
restructured with so little information about the way people live and think and
about how the law works that we have little reason to suppose that the reforms
can accomplish their purpose. This cannot be right.
IV. FAILURES
As to Holmes, I observed that he satfrequently for halfan hour on end,
with knitted brows and an abstractedair,but he swept the matteraway
with a wave of his hand when I mentioned it. "Data! data! data!" he
cried impatiently. "I can't make bricks without clay."
Arthur Conan Doyle
The Adventure of the CopperBeeches
We have just illustrated the need for empirical research by showing how
many crucial questions about family law can only be answered with empirical
research which has hardly been begun. We now enterprise another kind of
illustration of the need for empirical research. Here we take up the inquiry that
we began at the end of the last section. That is, we examine research that has been
done for evidence about the law's effectiveness.
To be blunt: The law fails to achieve its intended effects with a regularity
that reproves law-maker and scholar alike. We are not talking about the
imperfections inevitable in all human institutions. We are talking about
widespread and substantial failures (of which we will give examples), failures of
which the law should be aware and which it should try to repair.
Much legal failure is unavoidable. Law fails because law-making is
unspeakably difficult. Some failures cannot be prevented; much law is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. But some failures can be prevented or
cured if law-makers can and do consult careful and thorough empirical research.
In what follows we adduce three examples of this kind of legal failure. First, we
describe evidence that law plays a markedly smaller role in the lives of citizens
than law-makers anticipate and scholars believe. Second, we analyze the broad
and deep failure of one legal field-the law of bioethics-to begin to accomplish
its ends. Third, we study the chronic failure of one favorite form of
regulation-mandated disclosure-to solve the problems for which it is so
insistently and casually adduced.
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A. COWS AND CONTRACTS
Those members of the community who fall short of this, somewhat
indefinite,normaldegree ofprowess or ofproperty suffer in the esteem
of their fellow-men; and consequently they suffer also in their own
esteem, since the usual basis of self-respect is the respect accordedby
one's neighbours.Only individualswith an aberranttemperament can
in the long run retain their self-esteem in the face of the disesteem of
theirfellows.
Thorstein Veblen
The Theory of the Leisure Class
If there is one thing law-makers need in making law and scholars need in
formulating theories, it is an understanding of law's effects. Here, we are all
hyper-rationalists. Almost universally, law-makers, law professors, and citizens
assume that law has some effect, even if it can't do all it is intended to do, and
that the direction of the effect is roughly the one intended. Everyone knows that
no law is enforced rigidly (traffic laws teach everyone this lesson every day);
everyone knows that even earnestly enforced laws are breached regularly (a
lesson murder statistics teach too often). Nevertheless, we-law-makers and
scholars and citizens-basically assume law basically works in basically
successful ways.
We suppose this because it should be true. The incentives to obey and use
and accommodate the law are numerous and sharp. Law enjoys impressive
powers, civilly and criminally. It creates and reinforces social institutions." 7 It
has "expressive" powers; it "sends messages."1"8 It has facilitative functions
which it performs by offering people the means (contracts, for example) to
accomplish their goals. Even when people do not directly use the law, they
bargain in its shadow, they depend on its default provisions, they are
unconsciously swayed by the symbols the law deploys and the messages it
broadcasts." 9 These are standard assumptions in scholarly thought. They are not
flatly wrong, but they are so unreliable that they chronically lead law-makers and
scholars astray. In this section, then, our goal is to convince our colleagues that
7
11 Carl

(1992).

E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in Family Law, 20 Hofstra Law Review 495

8

11

Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Function ofFamily Law,22 U California-Davis
L Rev

991 (1989).

119 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case

of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979). On these functions of law, see Chapter 11.2 of Carl E. Schneider
& Margaret F. Brinig, An Invitation to Family Law: Principles,Process, and Perspectives(West,
2001) ( 2 d edition).
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the standard assumptions about law's effectiveness are so fanciful that they must
always be checked through empirical research.
One of the most disconcerting bodies of modem legal writing is the
scholarship which makes sport of the idea (so natural and right to lawyers) that
people know the law's rules, accept them, respond to them, and use them. A
seminal and classic work in this sobering and reproving genre is Stewart
Macaulay's Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy.12 °
Professor Macaulay interviewed suppliers and purchasers in Wisconsin to see
how they used contracts and how the law shaped their behavior. The firms did not
think they were using contracts (even when, legally, they were), and disputes
were "frequently settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual
legal sanctions." Far from heeding the law, businessmen devised their own norms
and sanctions. As one said, "'You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each
other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he
wants to stay in business because one must behave decently."'
Or take Robert Ellickson's fascinating sojourn among the ranchers and
farmers in Shasta County, California."' Professor Ellickson wanted to test the
Coase Theorem's principle that people bargain to reach economically efficient
solutions to their disputes whatever the law's allocation of tort liability. As the
Theorem predicted, the locus of liability did not matter when wandering cattle
damaged a farmer's crops. But not because people bargained to achieve efficient
results. Rather, disputes were avoided in deference to an informal norm of
neighborliness and reciprocity, a norm enforced by the community's homemade
sanctions.
People can ignore the law even when brought face to face with its power. It's
no surprise that people marry in ignorance of the law of divorce. 122 But even
during divorces, when people are in the law's grip, they often do not know what
the law says or behave in the ways law-makers intended. Research suggests that
when divorcing couples meet their lawyers, they frame their story in terms of
their marriage's moral relations. Lawyers may frame the case in the law's terms,
but clients often find those terms misconceived and perverse, and lawyers
regularly fail to convince clients to adopt the law's framework. Furthermore,
because most families cannot afford to pay lawyers to negotiate for them,
12028 American Sociological Rev 55 (1963).
21
1 Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard U Press, 1991).
122 Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Every RelationshipIs AboveAverage: Perceptions
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 Law & Behavior 439 (1993). Nor do
employees know basic facts about employment law. "Kim... found that the vast majority of those
[workers] surveyed [wrongly] believed that the law prevents employers from discharging an
employee because, among other reasons, the employer does not like them (89%) or the employer
wishes to hire someone else at a lower wage (82%)." Russell Korobkin, EmpiricalScholarship in
ContractLaw: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls,2002 U Illinois Law Rev 1033, 1049.
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divorcing spouses frequently negotiate for themselves. This they do in ignorance
of, indifference to, and even contempt for the law's standards. ("'If the law
supposes that,' said Mr. Bumble, squeezing his hat emphatically in both hands,
'the law is a ass - a idiot. If that's the law, the law is a bachelor; and the worst
I wish the law is, that his eye may be opened by experience - by experience."')
No one supposes the law is wholly ineffectual, but the general impression
of its effectiveness is wrong and the ordinary intuitions about its functioning are
untrustworthy. The problem for law-makers and scholars is that they don't know
whether and how the general impression and ordinary intuitions are correct in a
particular case. Only through empirical research can they find out.
B. DEFEAT AND FUTILITY
What have we better than a blind guess to show that the criminal law
in its presentform does more good than harm?
Oliver Wendell Holmes
The Path of the Law
The law, people imagine, is like the centurion: "I say to this man, Go, and
he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and
he doeth it." But with dismaying and confounding frequency, laws betray the
expectations which prompted their adoption. We propose the law of bioethics-a
preponderance of which can plausibly be said to have failed-as our example.
The problems begin with the law-making process. When proponents of a rule
present it to a legislature, an agency, or a court, they normally make their case by
telling a story with a victim and a villain. Restrain the villain and the victim can
be rescued. Law-makers evaluate the story, but they must husband their time and
energies, and they command limited resources for studying evidence. Without a
well-developed body of research, law-makers will be at the mercy of the stories
told by proponents, and of course opponents, of regulations. These stories achieve
their effects by making the complex simple. Much is then ignored. Research
regularly reveals that the victim is not so simply a victim, that the villain is not
so villainous, that victim and villain alike are constrained by circumstances they
do not control, and that both respond to new rules in unexpected ways.
An example. For years it was assumed that dying patients (the victims) were
being kept alive by doctors (the villains) professionally driven to keep metabolic
function ticking. Why did patients acquiesce? Because, said the story, they were
too ill and too cowed to make their own decisions, leaving doctors free to
persevere. Patients could have left instructions in a "living will," but they didn't
because, the story continued, they knew naught of living wills. The solution,
cheap and simple? Make medical institutions tell patients about living wills.

No. 1]

LIFE'S GOLDEN TREE

Congress heard and believed. With cursory debate and comforting
consensus, it passed the Patient Self-Determination Act. To what effect?
Apparently, none. The PSDA seems hardly to have touched end-of-life care.
Why? First, patients are disinclined to sign living wills. Second, patients are more
anxious to live, even in extremis, than Congress imagined. Third, doctors are
today less intent on keeping patients alive than Congress thought.' 23 Fourth, endof-life decisions have a dynamic of their own that is unaltered by living wills. So,
the PSDA's surest consequence is that medical institutions spend hundreds of
millions of dollars setting up and administering otiose programs. One
commentator even thinks that "the PSDA, rather than promoting autonomy has
'done a disservice to most real patients and their families and caregivers.' It has
promoted the execution of uninformed and under-informed advance directives,
and has undermined, not protected, self-determination. The PSDA looks like an
utter failure."' 24 And this was an idea whose merits were as undoubted as they
were unexamined.
The problem is not just the PSDA; it is the living will. Promoting its use has
become a legal and social virtue, yet research suggests that living wills do not
work and never will. Cascades of evidence now show that patients do not
formulate clear and reliable preferences in advance about end-of-life treatment
and that patients' preferences cannot be put into language that communicate them
effectively. This evidence, however, is buried in medical journals. The law
professors who are situated to make and analyze proposals for law reform do not
do this kind of research themselves, and few of them carefully investigate the
medical literature. So the conventional wisdom embracing living wills has
penetrated unmolested to bar and medical associationj ournals and to doctors' and
lawyers' practices as another service to be sold to patients and clients.2 5
The PSDA was legislation. Judicial law-making can be equally oblivious to
empirical reality. In Canterburyv. Spence, 2 6 Dr. Spence's laminectomy left Mr.
Canterbury a wreck. The court held that Dr. Spence had a duty to provide Mr.
Canterbury with the information he needed to decide whether to have a
laminectomy. The court imposed this duty of informed consent because doctors
(the villains) were denying patients (the victims) their right to make medical
decisions. The court consulted not a jot or tittle of real evidence about how

123Doctors' attitudes are affected by their age, location, specialty, and much besides.
But
doctors feel the same cultural currents that sway the rest of us, and many doctors have abandoned
"life at24any cost" and embraced "quality more than quantity."

1 Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptationof Miranda to Advance Directives:A Critique
of the Implementation
of the Patient Self-DeterminationAct, 9 Health Matrix 139, 167 (1999).
25
1

Living wills are demolished in Angela Fagerlin & Carl E.Schneider, Enough: The Failure

of the Living Will, 34 Hastings Center Report 30 (March/April 2004).
126464 F2d 772 (1972).
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informed consent might work, nor did it display any interest in whether the cost
of informed consent was repaid in benefits.
The court thought informed consent patently desirable, and what law-maker
or scholar would disagree? Nevertheless, informed consent is at worst a failure
and at best a frustrating disappointment. The court assumed that patients hunger
to make their own decisions and are thwarted by imperialistic doctors. But
decades of evidence now establish that many patients feel no such hunger and
that as patients become older and sicker any such hunger dwindles away.' 27 Even
doctors who try earnestly and arduously are baffled when they attempt to equip
patients to make intelligent medical decisions. Patients misunderstand even the
do not remember what they are told, and do not
most basic facts about treatments,
28
analyze it accurately.1
Take a short sip from the flood of evidence. Clarence Braddock and his
colleagues taped 1057 encounters between doctors and patients. "Overall, the
completeness of informed decision making was low.... [Flew decisions (9.0%)
met criteria for completeness of informed decision making." The "findings
suggest that the ethical model of informed decision making is not routinely
applied in office practice" and that the "low level of informed decision making
129
suggests that physicians' typical practice is out of step with ethical ideals."'
No one wants to return to the bad old days of medical tyranny. But
regulating the relations of doctors and patients is as hard as it is important.
Uninformed and ill-considered rules are doomed to disappoint. Only with
empirical research can we get a realistic sense of what is possible and sensible
ideas about how to achieve it.
In our discussion of the failures of the law of bioethics, we have used two
examples-informed consent and living wills-because they have been so central
and triumphant a part of that law. But many other aspects of it are also
ineffective. For example, by 1990, eighteen states had passed laws regulating
what doctors tell patients about treating breast cancer. The story that drove these
laws was that doctors (the villains) were withholding information about
lumpectomies. The effect of these laws? "[S]tate laws requiring the disclosure of
alternatives for the treatment of breast cancer were temporally associated with
slight increases (6 to 13 percent) in the use of breast-conserving surgery in the
states with the most directive laws. The increases were transient, however, lasting
from 3 to 12 months, after which the use of breast-conserving surgery reverted

127See Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients, Doctors, and Medical
(Oxford U Press, 1998).
Decisions
28

1 See Chapter 1 of Marsha Garrison & Carl E. Schneider, The Law of Bioethics: Individual

Autonomy
and Social Regulation (West, 2003).
129Clarence H. Braddock et al, DecisionMaking in OutpatientPractice:Time to Get Back to
Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999).
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to the level expected on the basis of the trend in states without specific
legislation." 130
Once again, the proponents of the legislation told a story whose
simplifications so distorted the world that the legislation failed. No one
remembered that "a major determinant of the choice of therapy appears to be the
recommendation of the surgeon, which would not be expected to be affected by
the legislation. Also, research by Nayfield et al suggests that only a minority of
patients with cancer pursue a decision-making process that is enhanced by
additional information; for some patients such information may complicate the
process.'' What is more, "[c]ontrary to tacit beliefs.... patient involvement in
surgical decision making [is] associated with a greater likelihood of receiving
mastectomy."' 13' These laws, then, rested on demonstrably false assumptions
about how human beings think and act, and the laws failed. What remains is more
regulations whose fatuity convinces their subjects that the law is ignorant,
witless, and malign, something doctors are already all too willing to believe.
The modem law of bioethics is now several decades old. Most scholarly
writing simply ignores the evidence that that law mocks the hopes that led to its
adoption, and hardly any of it investigates the success of the bioethical agenda.
We know as much about it as we do not because of law professors, but because
of doctors, who--deplorably-seem more interested than lawyers
in doing the
133
empirical work it takes to find out whether the law works.

130 Ann Butler Nattinger et al, The Effect of Legislative Requirements on the Use of BreastConserving
Surgery, 335 New England J Medicine 1035 (1996).
131Ibid at 1039.
32
1 Steven J. Katz et al, Patient Involvement in Surgery Treatment Decisionsfor Breast

Cancer,
23 J Clinical Oncology 5526, 5530 (2005).
33
1 Bioethics is our example of legal failure that is partly caused by lack of empirical research
and partly curable with a stiff dose of it, but similar problems curse many fields. A few examples.
(1) "[T]hough criminal law scholarship has a distinct discipline to draw on--criminology-it has
barely tried to benefit from the relationship. The best empirical studies in contemporary criminology
tend to be intellectually and politically paralyzing, tending to show that most law enforcement or
crime prevention policies are counter-productive or counter-intuitively irrelevant." Robert
Weisberg, CriminalLaw, Criminology,andthe Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 Colorado L Rev
521, 525 (1992). (2) "[W]hile there is enormous attention to deterrence as a goal of tort law, there
is substantial doubt about the actual deterrence efficacy of tort law." Gary T. Schwartz, Empiricism
and Tort Law, 2002 U Illinois L Rev 1067, 1068. (3) "[I] have been struck by the absence of
empirical evidence bearing on the traditional, defining assumption of administrative law
theory-that reviewing courts can control agency behavior through judicial remands." Peter Schuck,
Why Don't Law ProfessorsDo More EmpiricalResearch?, 39 J Legal Education 323, 334 (1989).
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C. TELLING AND HEARING
He'll sit here, and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' And nothing will
happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very
frustrating.
Harry Truman
In the preceding section, we used the law of bioethics to show what happens
when laws are adopted with little empirical investigation and maintained without
empirical assessment. In this section, we use another vehicle for a similar inquiry.
When the strong deal with the weak, law often tries to deter the former from
abusing the latter by requiring the stronger party to reveal information that allows
the weaker party to make good decisions in the relationship. Are companies
selling worthless stocks? Securities laws say, "Disclose!" Are creditors lending
money usuriously? Consumer protection laws say, "Disclose!" Are manufacturers
selling hazardous merchandise? Products-liability law says, "Disclose!" Are
police bullying criminal suspects into waiving their rights? Miranda says,
"Disclose!" Are spouses soliciting shady antenuptial contracts? Family law says,
"Disclose!" Behold, then, disclosure, the sovereign remedy for all your ills. Does
it work?
If disclosure requirements prosper anywhere, it should be in securities
markets, since they are dominated by institutions which have reasons and
resources to use the disclosed information. But even there, scholars cannot agree
that companies would disclose less were there no securities laws (since
companies have economic incentives to disclose information to investors) or that
the disclosures that are made improve investors' decisions.' 34
Most other disclosure regimes look worse, some much worse. Critics of
Mirandahave long contended that Mirandawarnings work too well and let the
criminal go free because the constable blundered. Miranda'sfriends leap to its
defense by arguing that its requirements "'have little or no effect on a suspect's
propensity to talk ....Next to the warning label on cigarette packs, Mirandais
the most widely ignored piece of official advice in our society.' .. . Not only has

Miranda largely failed to achieve its stated and implicit goals, but police have
transformed Miranda into a tool of law enforcement.. ..',"
134See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the

Protection
of Investors, 70 Virginia L Rev 669 (1984).
135Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
Michigan L Rev 1000 (2001). There is "a clear consensus in the empirical studies of Warren-court
reforms that the Mirandaand Mapp decisions have had no serious dampening effect on the police."
Robert Weisberg, CriminalLaw, Criminology,andthe Small World of Legal Scholars,63 Colorado
L Rev 521, 567 (1992).
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Much law obliges manufacturers and employers to provide warnings about
hazardous products and even products that may be used hazardously. While the
evidence of failure is not uniform, "the efforts of researchers to prove by
scientific means that on-product warnings are indeed effective to modify safetyrelated behavior in actual or simulated real-world applications have generally
'
yielded disappointing results."136
Mandatory disclosure is "the primary Federal mechanism for regulating the
consumer credit market." The epitome of such regulation is the Truth in Lending
Act, which requires lenders to disclose information about the loan to borrowers.
But "it would not be an overstatement that the very core of TLA-the provision
of the finance charge and the APR to facilitate comparison shopping-suffers
from several theoretical and practical problems that have vexed commentators
and regulators from the very passage of the Act." The "problems" are basic.
"[E]xperts... express serious doubt as to whether consumers read their TILA
disclosures." Even if they read them, many consumers lack the literacy and
numeracy to understand them. Even if the words and numbers are understood, the
ideas they convey are often misunderstood, since the ideas are unfamiliar and
since lenders "charge a multiplicity of different fees, and inclusion in the APR is
handled inconsistently from lender to lender." What is more, disclosures are
buried in a mass of papers and come so late in the process that borrowers cannot
practically back out. But fear not, "members of Congress have not given up on
the concept of disclosure. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 [requires]. . . enhanced disclosure for open-end credit
plans and credit extensions secured by a dwelling, and new disclosures for
introductory (teaser) rates and late payment deadlines and penalties."' 3 7
A similar pattern appears in a newly critical area--decisions to purchase
health-care. "Consumer-driven health care" is the derniercri in health law as it
undergoes the Gotterdammerungof managed care. Much effort has already been
devoted to supplying patients with the information they need to choose healthcare plans. These efforts are failing. For example, when focus groups are asked
to respond to the report cards offered to consumers, they "commonly respond that
they find the information overwhelming and confusing and that they do not know
how to bring all the pieces of information together into a decision. Many say they
prefer to have someone tell them which plan to choose."' 3 8
Dr. Johnson famously called a second marriage "the triumph of hope over
experience." What can we say of mandatory disclosure? To the hyper-rationalist,
36

1 Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious Dangers, The Duty

to Warn
of Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding Presumption,65 Brooklyn L Rev 717 (1999).
37

1 Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure:

Socio-Economics and the Questfor Truth in Lending, 14 Cornell J L & Public Policy 199 (2005).
38
' Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisionsin Health Care:Implicationsfrom
Decision-MakingResearch, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 398 (1997).
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mandatory disclosure's effectiveness is obvious. It has to work. But as we have
been arguing by word and example throughout this section and indeed this article,
the work of both law-makers and law professors rests on assumptions about
human beings and legal institutions that seem right but that turn out to be wrong.
Without empirical research into those assumptions before law is made, bad laws
will be put in books. Without empirical research into the success of regulations,
bad laws will survive in action. To empirical research, therefore, we call our
colleagues and pledge ourselves.
V. CONCLUSION
Know then thyself presume not God to scan
The proper study of mankind is man.
Placedon this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the sceptic side,
With too much weaknessfor the stoic's pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;
In doubt to deem himself a God, or beast;
In doubt his mind or body to prefer;
Born but to die, and reas 'ning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such
Whether he thinks too little, or too much;
Chaos of thought and passion, all confus'd;
Still by himself abus 'd or disabus'd;
Createdhalf to rise and half tofall;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all,
Sole judge of truth, in endless errorhurl'd;
The glory, jest and riddle of the world.
Alexander Pope
An Essay on Man
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Our colleges are supposed to be schools of science as well as of
education, nor is it unreasonableto expect that a body of literary men
devoted to a life of celibacy, exempt from the care of their own
subsistenceand amply provided with books, shoulddevote theirleisure
to the prosecutionof study, and that some effects of their studies should
be manifested to the world.
Edward Gibbon
Autobiography
Ultimately, law professors do not do empirical research because they do not
want to. They do not want to because they do not sufficiently value it. If they
wanted to do it, the barriers to empirical research would rapidly, if arduously, be
scaled and eventually razed.
One obstacle to large-scale empirical work is little within the profession's
control-expense. But law professors are better supported than most scholars,
and law schools have resources to help them in useful ways. Where all else fails,
we must do what social and natural scientists routinely do-get grants from
governmental agencies and private foundations. This is not pleasant, but why
should we be exempt from burdens other academics bear without (undue) selfpity?
Another discouragement to empirical work lies at the feet of judges and
other law-makers, who persist in the tradition of "judicial amateurism" which
Professor Riesman castigated half a century ago39 and ignore empirical data even
when offered it. As a distinguished jurist replied when one of us adduced some
empirical evidence (which would in fact have confirmed thejurist' s preferences),
"I know other people live differently from the way I do, and I'm not interested."
In a world where every political question becomes a judicial one, the Supreme
Court too regularly decides cases as though facts were so many packing
peanuts. 4 ° The professorial writ does not run to judges, thank goodness. But
139David Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, TrainingandColleagueship,9 Stanford

651 n15 (1957).
L Rev 643,
40
Three examples. (1) "Romer and the VMI case were... so barren of any engagement with
reality that the issue of their correctness scarcely arises. It is the lack of an empirical footing that is
and always has been the Achilles heel of constitutional law, not the lack of good constitutional
theory." Richard A. Posner, Against ConstitutionalTheory, 73 NYU L Rev 1, 21 (1998). (2) "The

Court strikes down rules of criminal procedure because they 'fail to protect privacy ... and impede
effective law enforcement.' The Court upholds other rules because they embody a 'carefully crafted
balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests.' These statements,
while obviously empirical, are made ... with absolutely no attempt to assess relevant empirical
evidence." Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and
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judges (and clerks) were once law students. If we take empirical work seriously
in our scholarship, the fruits of that work and a sense of its merit may gradually
insinuate itself into our teaching and thence into the minds of lawyers and judges.
We do control most of the other barriers to serious empirical research.
Professor Shuck describes one of them with appropriate candor: "From the
perspective of an individual scholar seeking to maximize careerist objectives,
empirical scholarship is something to be assiduously avoided."'' Law faculties
with good sense and a dollop of resolve can fix this problem. They can begin by
reforming their behavior at tenure time, when it matters most. Today, too many
of the tenured think empirical work cannot permit candidates to demonstrate the
theoretical magnificence and prophetic intelligence elite law faculties think they
want. Untenured faculty should not bear the burden of demonstrating the error of
that attitude.
We are optimists, though (sort of). Young academics increasingly
incorporate empirical work into their scholarship, and they are getting tenure.' 4 2
As they become more numerous they should make tenure decisions more wisely
than their elders.
We now come to a critical issue for the prospects of empirical scholarship,
one that demands a few moments' reflection. Some law professors avoid
empirical research because law journals dislike it and spurn it. Certainly they do.
The students to whom we indolently confide our professional journals think
scholarship is what scholars tell them it is. Few students are academic
revolutionaries. On the contrary. While students in elite law schools lean steeply
left on most political issues, on academic matters they cherish a conservatism that
would make a backwoods Junker blink. Of course. They are frightened. They
should be. They are too untutored to do the job we cruelly ask of them. Enough.
We can no longer afford the costs-of which this is but one-of ceding our
scholarly journals to terrified amateurs.' 4 3

Procedure-And Three Answers, 2002 U Illinois L Rev 851, 855-56. (3) "American jurists of

criminal law rarely study the reality of the American criminal justice system but potter happily away
in an Alice-in-Wonderland world where defendants with competent lawyers go on trial and argue
strenuously about mens rea or the rules of evidence or the exact weight or implication of the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights." Graham Hughes, The GreatAmerican Legal ScholarshipBazaar,
33 J Legal
Education 424, 429 (1983).
4
1 1Peter Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical
Research?, 39 J Legal
Education
42 323, 331 (1989).
1 Professor Schneider secretly longs for law schools to give tenure only
for empirical work.
This would swell the volume of empirical research, compel young scholars to learn to do it, offer
them a compelling lesson in its usefulness, and deter them from theorizing about the world before
they understand
it. Of course, he knows just how likely this is.
143For further animadversions, enjoy Carl E. Schneider, The Book Review Issue: An
Owner's
Manual, 96 Michigan L Rev 1363 (1998).
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The costs are not only great, they are growing. The core problem is wellknown: Student editors are, at most, trained in doctrinal analysis. When that was
the bulk of legal scholarship, a good school's best students might aspire to a
modest editorial competence. Now that less and less scholarship is doctrinal, even
the best school's best students cannot evaluate the articles submitted to journals,
much less edit them. Indeed, no individual faculty member is competent to do so,
which is why scholarly journals in other fields ask specialists to review every
article they accept (something student editors are culpably reluctant to do).
Even while it is getting harder for students to edit law reviews, the quality
of law review staffs is declining. The number of law reviews per school has
increased, often several fold. At the same time, the size of law review staffs has
swollen astonishingly. When Professor Schneider edited volume 77 of the
MichiganLaw Review, roughly thirty juniors joined the review each year. Today
roughly fifty do. Volume 77 enjoyed one article editor (although two or three
were probably more common) and no book review editors. Volume 105 sports
six article editors, a symposium editor, and two book review editors. Because of
these two developments, law reviews must accept less and less qualified students.
Worse, there is a movement away from using grades to select editors toward
student-judged writing competitions and toward affirmative action.
A scholarly field's professional journals critically shape the field through
their choice of articles to publish. A field, then, suffers when editors are
incompetent (as students must be). It's not just that bad decisions are made about
individual articles. It's that undesirable and even improper criteria too easily
influence publication decisions. Editorial hostility to empirical research is the
example that particularly exercises us, but there are vast swaths of law that
student editors ignore. Judge Posner expresses other fears we share: Student
editors seem to be "tempted by the increasing politicization of the enterprise to
employ political criteria in their editorial decisions." And, unable to evaluate
articles well, "they look for signals of quality or other merit," signals like the
prestige of the author and the author's school. 1" All these problems are
compounded by the fact that most law professors act as though the acceptance of
an article by an elite school's journal says something valuable about the article's
merits and even the author's. La trahison des clercs.
Law reviews are virtually unreformable. No institution whose membership
changes annually can make its reforms stick. And the tradition of law review
"independence"-where did this unaccountable and foolish notion come
from?-means that the scholars who understand legal scholarship best are barred
from shaping review policy. (They are already inhibited because it feels like
bullying to criticize students, even students who are custodians of the
144Richard A. Posner, The Future ofthe Student-EditedLaw Review, 47 Stanford L Rev 1131,
1133 (1995).
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profession's journals.) Nor, crucially, do law professors yearn for the tiresome
burden of editing their professional journals themselves.
Faculty-edited journals are hardly all they should be. For example, they can
be impressively dilatory. Peer-review has its defects. Peer reviewers are not as
objective, thorough, and reliable as we wish. They prefer research that confirms
their own views, they may unduly prefer the conventional wisdom, and they have
other faults besides. 4 5 But these problems are as nothing compared with the
disaster law reviews visit on legal scholarship. In our happy experience, the
scholar-editors of journals in other disciplines at least do not harass their authors
with the "stylistic"and substantive improvements beloved of law review editors,
and they regularly offer substantive help--personally or through peer
reviewers-that is substantively helpful.
One other barrier to empirical research deserves comment. Many law
professors hesitate to do it because they do not know how. Scholars whose
education ended in law school fear the forbidding quantitative techniques of the
social sciences and proclaim themselves unequipped for empiricism. We dream
utopian dreams for training law professors. Formal training in empirical methods
should be required of all law students, since lawyers increasingly encounter
methodologically sophisticated evidence and arguments in their work. Future law
professors would then at least have a small start in empirical research, and they
might then take advanced courses in other departments.
We could also revive the S.J.D. and make training in empirical techniques
central to it. Law schools hire candidates with only a J.D. partly because of
competition with law firms and among law schools. The expanding scope of legal
scholarship and rising tenure standards make this unfortunate. Furthermore, the
increasingly academic orientation of law faculties may be attracting candidates
for whom the practice of law is less alluring and who therefore might accept a
genuinely graduate education. Since law professors are among the least trained
academics, these proposals seem modest enough.
Even without radical change, however, professors can surmount inadequate
training. More and more of the people entering law school teaching already have
(or are acquiring) Ph.D.s in other disciplines, and a few even earn degrees after
being hired. But exemplary zeal is rarely necessary. Many empirical methods can
be learned by taking a few courses or soliciting the help of colleagues from

45

1

For a review of some of the empirical evidence about peer review, see Frank Cross et al,

Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U Chicago L Rev 135, 148 n97 (2002). For
an account of the current unrest in political science and the unhappiness with its professional
journals, see Kristen Renwick Monroe, ed, Perestroika:The Raucous Rebellion in PoliticalScience
(Yale U Press, 2005).
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around the university. 14 6 After all, we define "empirical" broadly, and many kinds
of empirical work do not demand penetrating statistical sophistication. In our
rewarding experience, social scientists are wonderfully generous in helping the
eager law professor to adequate technical competence.
Law professors ought also to seek out collaborations with social scientists
trained in empirical research. Collaboration to ameliorate lack of training
flourishes in other parts of the university. (Medical schools are a model here.)
There are fine and even famous collaborations in law, but our ethos runs against
them: "[J]oint authorship has been and remains uncommon in law. No
statistically significant increase in the rate of joint authorship occurred [in this
study's period], nor does the rate of joint authorship vary across [prestige]
quintiles."' 47 Collaborations not only help methodologically; they deepen and
brighten the law professor's understanding of legal problems. Furthermore, we
know from collaborating with each other and with other people that collaboration
brings benefits, satisfactions, and joys to the collaborators they can hardly find
otherwise.
In sum, the reasons law professors resist empirical work are many. A few of
them present genuine difficulties. But most can be solved by individual law
professors, and virtually all of them can be eliminated by a willing profession. It
is time to try.
B. REAPING THE REWARDS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Of course, this is a somewhat vague conclusion. But in a question of
significance,of worth, like this, conclusions can never be precise. The
answer of appreciation,of sentiment, is always a more or a less, a
balance struck by sympathy, insight, andgood will. But it is an answer,
all the same, a real conclusion.And in the course ofgetting it, it seems
to me that our eyes have been opened to many important things.
William James
What Makes a Life Significant

146,"[With a little reading on methods and a handful of consultations with empiricist

colleagues, there is no reason that a careful contract law scholar with no formal training in empirical
techniques should have serious difficulty designing a methodologically satisfactory study." Russell
Korobkin, EmpiricalScholarshipin ContractLaw: Possibilitiesand Pitfalls,2002 U Illinois L Rev
1033, 1051.
147Michael J. Saks et al, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice,and Legal
Scholarship?:A Systematic ComparisonofLaw Review Articles One GenerationApart, 30 Suffolk
U L Rev 353, 367 (1996).

106

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[2006: 53

"Administrative man," Herbert Simon wrote, "recognizes that the world he
perceives is a drastically simplified model of the buzzing, blooming confusion
that constitutes the real world. He is content with the gross simplification because
he believes that the real world is mostly empty-that most of the facts of the real
world have no great relevance to any particular situation he is facing and that
most significant chains of causes and consequences are short and simple."' 4 8 The
lawyer uncomfortably resembles administrative man in his hyper-rationalism.
Few law-makers can do the research which would reveal the buzzing, blooming
confusion. But law professors can. It is their job. For a century, they have been
called to it. Their duty has become too exigent to flout.
But this duty should also be a pleasure. We have saved the best for last. Law
is not just a set of jigsaw puzzles to solve. Law is not just the reflection of great
issues of principle. Law is about how people live their lives. Empirical research
is satisfying because it allows those of us privileged to help shape the law to
understand life as human beings live it. People are more interesting than legal
theories suppose (and than legal theories themselves), and even the most distant
and abstract empirical research soon uncovers the stubborn complexity and
endearing perversity that baffle the law-maker but enchant the human being.
And when his studies let the scholar meet, talk with, and get to know the
people the law regulates, he is blessed indeed. He is taken out of himself and his
tower. Americans are almost madly generous with their time and their intimacy.
If the researcher cares about them, they will invite him into their lives, show him
their world, and teach him their thoughts. The fortunate researcher finds in his
work preceptors to heed, people to admire, and friends to cherish. Und griin des
Lebens goldner Baum.

148Quoted in James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain
Schemes to Improve the

Human Condition Have Failed45 (Yale U Press, 1998).

